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Concepts are widely agreed to be the basic constituents of thought. Amongst philosophers 
and psychologists, however, the question of how concepts are structured has been a 
longstanding problem and a locus of disagreement. I draw on recent work describing how 
representational content is ascribed to populations of neurons to develop a novel solution 
to this problem.  
Because disputes over the structure of concepts often reflect divergent explanatory 
goals, I begin by arguing for a set of six criteria that a good theory ought to accommodate. 
These criteria address philosophical concerns related to content, reference, scope, 
publicity, and compositionality, and psychological concerns related to categorization 
phenomena and neural plausibility. 
Next, I evaluate a number of existing theoretical approaches in relation to these six 
criteria. I consider classical views that identify concepts with definitions, similarity-based 
views that identify concepts with prototypes or exemplars, theory-based views that 
identify concepts with explanatory schemas, and atomistic views that identify concepts 
with unstructured mental symbols that enter into law-like relations with their referents. I 
conclude that none of these accounts can satisfactorily accommodate all of the criteria.  
I then describe the theory of representational content that I employ to motivate a 
novel account of concept structure. I briefly defend this theory against competitors, and I 
describe how it can be scaled from the level of basic perceptual representations to the 
level of highly complex conceptual representations. On the basis of this description, I 
contend that concepts are structured dynamically through sets of transformations of single 
source representation, and that the content of a given concept specifies the set of potential 
transformations it can enter into. I conclude by demonstrating that the ability of this 
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Concepts, Cognitive Science, and Explanatory Goals 
1.1 Introduction 
 By common agreement in philosophy and psychology, concepts are the basic building 
blocks of thought (Murphy, 2002; Laurence & Margolis, 1999). They play a foundational 
role in almost all explanations of the nature of our mental lives, and they are invoked 
ubiquitously in discussions of a broad range of psychological phenomena including 
categorization, language use, learning, and inference. In addition to their use in explaining 
mental phenomena, concepts have also been a focus of philosophical analysis since antiquity, 
with scholars ranging from Plato to Gettier preoccupying themselves with the clarification of 
concepts like JUSTICE and KNOWLEDGE.1 Accordingly, the stakes in both philosophy and the 
cognitive sciences are high when it comes to the correct characterization of such things as the 
ontology, structure, and origin of concepts.  
 It is likely for this reason that concept research has attracted so much attention and 
controversy (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). The debates are complex. With respect to the 
ontology of concepts, scholars have argued alternately that concepts are mental 
representations, cognitive abilities, and abstract objects (Margolis & Laurence, 2005). With 
respect to the structure of concepts, treatments are similarly diverse: classical views identify 
concepts with definitions (e.g. Peacocke, 1992); similarity-based views identify concepts 
either with prototypes or sets of exemplars (e.g. Smith & Medin, 1981); theory-based views 
identify concepts with coherent sets of explanatory beliefs about the categories they represent 
                                                     
1 Small capital letters are used to refer to concepts throughout. 
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(e.g. Medin & Murphy, 1985); and atomistic views identify concepts with semantically 
unstructured mental symbols that enter into law-like relations with things in the world (e.g. 
Fodor, 1998). Finally, with respect to the origin of concepts, opinion is divided between 
empiricism (whose proponents claim to varying degrees that concepts are derived from 
perceptual experiences) and nativism (whose proponents claim to varying degrees that 
concepts are innate). It is helpful to recognize that a commitment in one realm of these 
debates often entails commitments in another. For example, the view that concepts are 
cognitive abilities is arguably incompatible with the view that concepts are structured as 
prototypes (and hence are representational).  
 Of these three broad topics in concept research, the problem of conceptual structure is 
arguably the most theoretically pressing. For one thing, there is a fairly general consensus 
amongst cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind that concepts are mental 
representations (Margolis & Laurence, 2005), and so I accordingly assume as much. For 
another, the question of whether empiricism or nativism is correct will in some sense depend 
upon how one addresses the problem of structure. To explain with an example, if perceptual 
representations figure in the best available theory of conceptual structure, then one will have 
reason to be suspicious of strong nativist claims, all else being equal. Another way to put this 
point is to say that by providing a thorough discussion of structure, one will likely either end 
up defending certain views about concept acquisition at the same time, or end up remaining 
neutral on the matter. Thus, giving primacy to the problem of structure is advantageous from 
the perspective of efficiency and presents no immediate drawbacks.   
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More importantly, by focusing on the problem of conceptual structure and assuming that 
concepts are representational, one can develop a highly useful strategy for adjudicating 
amongst different characterizations of concepts. Put simply, if concepts are mental 
representations, and mental representations are instantiated in neurobiological systems,2 then 
one should expect a good theory of concepts to be consistent with a successful account of 
how representational content is ascribed to the different parts of such systems. In other 
words, a theory of concepts that is consistent with a theory of content responsive to both 
philosophical and neuroscientific considerations ought to be preferred over a theory of 
concepts that is not, all else being equal. My purpose, accordingly, is to employ an existing, 
neurocomputationally grounded two-factor theory of content to motivate an account that 
identifies concepts with a specific type of content-bearing neural vehicle. This account builds 
on recent but distinct theories offered by Barsalou (1999, 2003, 2008), Eliasmith (2000, 2005 
forthcoming), and Prinz (2002), and it essentially claims that concepts are structured 
dynamically through sets of transformations of a single source representation called a 
‘semantic pointer’ (Eliasmith, forthcoming), whose content is specified holistically. Where 
the present account departs meaningfully from these precursors is in articulating a unique 
dynamic view of concept structure through a careful consideration of both philosophical 
concerns (e.g. reference determination) and neuroscientific concerns (e.g. neural plausibility, 
empirical adequacy).  
                                                     
2 The idea that mental representations are instantiated in neurobiological systems is 
uncontroversial assuming that materialism is correct (which I do). This claim is neutral with 
respect to the specific nature of the relation between the mental and the physical (i.e. 
reduction, supervenience, etc.) 
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Before proceeding, it is worth providing a rough outline of what follows. First, I establish 
a set of criteria that a good theory of concepts must meet. Many of these will be standard fare 
for researchers familiar with the field, but some associated with the aforementioned 
neuroscientific concerns are novel. Second, I briefly evaluate existing theories of concepts 
and demonstrate their inability to satisfactorily meet these criteria. Third, I outline and briefly 
defend the theory of content being employed. Fourth, I draw from both this theory of content 
and the list of criteria to establish grounds for adopting the view of concept structure that I 
endorse. Various objections to my arguments are considered throughout.  
 
1.2 Criteria for a Theory of Concepts 
While concepts are almost universally agreed to be the constituents of thought, they are 
also theoretical postulates that serve an explanatory function. Disputes over the nature of 
concepts, as Laurence and Margolis (1999) note, often reflect disagreement over what sorts 
of things a theory of concepts ought to accomplish. Psychologists typically focus on the use 
of concepts to explain the ability to categorize things into different classes, while 
philosophers are often more concerned with things like the matter of how concepts refer. In 
what follows, I argue for a list of six explanatory targets that I think a good theory of 
concepts ought to accommodate. These are: scope, publicity, categorization, content, 
compositionality, and neural plausibility. Many of these so-called ‘desiderata’ are 
commonplace in the concept literature, but I occasionally argue for a unique understanding of 
the conditions under which a particular criterion would be satisfied. Others, such as the 





As Jesse Prinz (2002) notes, there is a great deal of variety amongst the different 
types of concepts that human beings are capable of possessing. To give a rudimentary 
catalogue: there are concepts for perceivable objects, such as TABLE; there are abstract 
concepts, such as VIRTUE; there are concepts for theoretical posits, such as ELECTRON (Prinz, 
2002); there are mathematical concepts, such as SUM; and there are non-referring concepts, 
such as CENTAUR. Ideally, a theory of concepts should be able account for all of these 
different classes. I take this to be an uncontroversial criterion given its widespread 
acceptance amongst both psychologists (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Smith & Medin, 1981; Murphy, 
2002) and philosophers (e.g. Prinz, 2002; Laurence & Margolis, 1999).    
 
1.2.2 Publicity 
The fact that people are able to communicate effectively has led to widespread 
agreement that concepts must be shareable. If concepts are the constituents of thought, and 
language is used to express thought, then our words and sentences must connect in some way 
to our conceptual representations (Murphy, 2002). So, because we understand and use the 
same words and sentences, we must also understand and use the same underlying concepts.3  
A second reason that the publicity requirement is so widely accepted has to do with the 
                                                     
3 This sidesteps to some extent the issue of the precise relation between natural language and 
concepts. Some, like Fodor (1998), suggest that the meaning of a word is the concept it refers 
to, while others, like Prinz (2002), disagree. There is a further debate as to whether or not 
language is necessary for the possession of concepts (Margolis & Laurence, 2005). My 
intention is to remain neutral on these matters, since nothing in what follows hinges on them.  
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predictive adequacy of generalized intentional explanations of behavior. Such explanations 
are of the sort ‘If X is thirsty, then X will seek water.’ As Fodor (1998) notes, generalizations 
of this kind would be explanatorily idle if everyone possessed a different WATER concept. 
Thus, concepts like WATER must be public. Psychologists also acknowledge the importance 
of this criterion via discussions of ‘concept stability’ (e.g. Smith & Medin, 1981, p. 10) 
Meeting the publicity requirement can occur in two ways. On the one hand, a theory 
of concepts can specify a type-token relation such that everyone who possesses a given 
concept (e.g. CIRCLE) literally tokens the same concept type (Fodor, 1998). This version of 
the criterion can be construed as requiring shared concepts to be strictly identical. On the 
other hand, a theory of concepts can specify a similarity relation such that shared concepts 
need only be alike to some minimal degree. Fodor (1998) rejects this view because he thinks 
that the required notion of similarity can only be construed in terms of partial identity 
between sets of structural components. This, he claims, does nothing to explicate a notion 
similarity that could apply to relations between unstructured mental symbols. However, so 
long as one does not presuppose that concepts are atomistic, understanding similarity in 
terms of partial identity between sets of structural components is not problematic. Thus, I 
take concept similarity across individuals to be sufficient for achieving publicity. 
 
1.2.3 Categorization 
 Amongst psychologists, concepts are often defined primarily as mechanisms for 
classifying different entities and drawing inferences about their properties (e.g. Medin & 
Murphy, 1985; Smith & Kosslyn, 2007; Smith & Medin, 1981). Accordingly, one commonly 
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held explanatory goal for postulating concepts is to account for the reams of empirical data 
describing such classificatory and inferential behaviors. For instance, so-called ‘typicality 
effects’ manifest themselves when subjects indentify certain category instances as more 
typical than others (Rosch, 1978). Typical instances of a class are categorized more quickly 
than atypical instances, and features of typical instances are more readily matched and 
generated in category production tasks (Rosch, 1978).4 Exemplar effects have also been 
demonstrated wherein atypical category instances that are highly similar to previously 
experienced instances get classified as rapidly or more quickly than typical instances (Prinz, 
2002). Moreover, subjects have been shown to override false general category judgments like 
‘all birds are eagles’ by producing counterexamples derived from prior experiences (Smith & 
Medin, 1981, p. 144). Finally, knowledge effects have been demonstrated in experiments 
where subjects are asked to categorize entities from one class that are transformed to look 
like members of a different class. For example, Keil (1989) shows that young children will 
identify horses disguised to look like prototypical zebras as horses based on knowledge of 
the disguise procedure. This research also suggests that the categorization of natural kinds is 
more susceptible to knowledge effects than the categorization of artificial kinds (Keil, 1989). 
Altogether, though, given that categorization tasks are fundamental to the use of concepts, 
explaining this empirical data ought to be a goal of any respectable theory.  
  
1.2.4 Content 
                                                     
4 Category production tasks are tasks where subjects are asked to produce features that are 
characteristic of members of a given category, or apply features to the correct category. 
Tasks involving the generation of category instances are also sometimes referred to as 
category production tasks. 
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 The fact that mental states and mental representations are about things means that 
they have content or meaning (Brown, 2002). This content, in turn, can be roughly defined as 
what any given representation “tells you about what it represents” (Eliasmith, 2000, p. 7). 
And since concepts are representations, the content of a concept is likewise what a concept 
tells you about the things it represents. Two aspects of conceptual content become salient 
here: first, there is the matter of determining what a given concept refers to, and second, there 
is the matter of determining what properties the concept ascribes to these referents 
(Eliasmith, 2000). In Fregean terms, this means that every concept has both a ‘reference’ and 
a ‘sense.’ 
The idea of that concepts refer is essentially what supports the use of concepts for 
categorization. In other words, the fact that concepts are used to classify different entities 
relies on the assumption that concepts are applicable to some things and not others. 
Accordingly, one reason for upholding the reference requirement for content is to 
accommodate the idea that categorization errors are possible (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). If 
concepts did not have their reference determined independently of a given individual’s 
categorization behaviors, there would be no meaningful sense in which a person could 
misclassify, say, a vegetable as a fruit. Clearly, categorization mistakes of this sort do occur, 
and the best way of explaining this fact is to stipulate that there is a class of things that a 
concept is taken to apply to on a given occasion, and that there is a class of things that a 
concept actually applies to on all occasions.5 For example, the concept WINE might be taken 
                                                     
5 I’m not committing to the claim here that all concepts have rigidly demarcated extensions. 
Fuzzy boundaries are very likely to occur in some instances; indeed, some scholars argue that 
such fuzziness is necessary (e.g. Murphy, 2002, p. 21). 
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to apply to grape juice in a wine glass, but it actually applies only to certain alcoholic 
beverages. Insisting on a reference criterion merely amounts to insisting that genuine 
misrepresentation is possible, which is in no way controversial (see e.g. Adams & Aizawa, 
2010; Fodor, 1987). 
 There is, however, some debate over whether the categories concepts refer to are 
naturally bounded, or bounded as the result of human cognitive processes (Prinz, 2002). 
Rosch (1978), for instance, claims that the human cognitive system latches onto “natural 
discontinuities” and co-occurring features in the perceivable world to form categories (p. 
192). Yet at the same time, Rosch (1978) also notes that the saliency of different features is 
likely to depend on human functional requirements that may vary across cultures. This 
suggests a more relativistic stance on category formation. Overall, I take the reference 
criterion to minimally require that categories be non-solipsistic, and I wish to remain neutral 
on deeper metaphysical debates about the reality of natural kinds. 
 The second, property-related aspect of conceptual content emerges from Frege’s 
(1892) classic observation that co-referring terms may nonetheless communicate distinct 
information. In the context of concepts, this means that co-extensive concepts can be distinct 
if they ascribe different sets of properties to the same referents. For example, the folk concept 
BIRD and the taxonomical concept AVES both refer to all and only birds, but they ascribe 
different properties. BIRD ascribes the properties we ordinarily take to be characteristic of 
birds, while AVES ascribes properties highlighting the category relations between birds and 
other classes of life forms. Because BIRD and AVES are clearly distinct concepts that possess 
identical referents, it is apparent that reference is not sufficient for determining content.  
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However, a close relative of this conclusion is also true. Putnam’s (1975) Twin Earth 
thought experiment illustrates that distinct concepts can ascribe the same properties to 
different referents. Twin Earth is a near-identical counterpart to Earth that differs only in the 
fact that the material that fills the role of water is actually composed of some material XYZ 
instead of H2O (Putnam, 1975). Hence, WATER on Earth refers to the chemical compound 
H2O, while WATERT on Twin Earth refers to some other compound XYZ. But because XYZ 
and H2O are literally indistinguishable, it is clear that both WATER and WATERT play identical 
roles and hence ascribe identical properties to different substances. The point to draw here is 
that property ascription alone is also insufficient for determining the content of a concept. 
Rather, reference and property ascription determine content together. One can generalize this 
conclusion by saying that co-extensive concepts that ascribe identical properties to their 
referents are identical.   
 Overall, the motives for proposing a content criterion should be obvious. The notion 
of conceptual content enables categorization errors and misrepresentations to occur. If 
concepts did not have clear referents, there would be no meaningful sense in which a concept 
could be misapplied. Furthermore, the notion of conceptual content explains cases in which 
different concepts ascribe distinct properties to the same thing, and cases in which different 
concepts apply the same properties to distinct things. Without this aspect of content, we 
would have to concede both that all co-referential concepts are identical, and that all concepts 
that ascribe the same properties are identical. This would be an unfortunate result. If it is 
agreed that the pairs AVES/BIRD and WATER/WATERT are not identical, then a satisfactory 





 The claim that concepts are compositional is essentially the conjunction of the claims 
that complex concepts are created by combining simple concepts through certain rules, and 
that the contents of complex concepts are derived from the contents of their constituent parts. 
Based on the preceding discussion of content, this means that complex concepts ascribe 
properties as some function of the way their constituent parts ascribe properties, and that 
complex concepts derive their extensions from the extensions of their constituent parts. In 
philosophical circles, the compositionality criterion has been championed by Jerry Fodor 
(1998), amongst others, but analogues of it are common in the psychological literature as 
well. Smith and Medin (1981), for instance, note that concepts function to combine in novel 
ways, while Murphy (2002) discusses a number of proposed models of such combination.  
 There are three primary reasons for imposing the compositionality criterion on a 
theory of concepts. The first reason is that compositionality explains the productivity of 
thought, or the ability for an infinite number of thoughts to be produced from a finite number 
of concepts or representations (Fodor, 1998). In linguistic terms, this can be illustrated by the 
empirical fact that people can understand and produce infinite numbers of entirely novel 
sentences (Aydede, 1998). Through inference to the best explanation, one can presume that 
this is because the meaning of such novel expressions derives from the meaning of their well-
comprehended constituent parts (Szabo, 2004). Likewise for concepts. The explanation of the 
reason I can produce the novel concept FURRY SPOON is because I already possess the 
concepts FURRY and SPOON and can combine them.  
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The second reason for the compositionality criterion is that it explains the 
systematicity of thought. Thoughts are systematic insofar as the ability to token one particular 
thought corresponds to the ability to token others with related content (Fodor, 1998). To use 
the classic example, being able to token the complex thought JOHN LOVES MARY empirically 
entails the ability to token the thought MARY LOVES JOHN in most if not all humans (Fodor, 
1987, p. 151). The reason compositionality explains this capacity is because the possession of 
combination rules and the concepts MARY, JOHN, and LOVES clearly allows for the ability to 
construct thoughts involving any number of different syntactic structures. In short, inference 
to the best explanation of systematicity favors a compositionality criterion (Szabo, 2004).  
Lastly, system constraints also favor the compositionality criterion. If every complex 
thought had to be stored and tokened as a unique unstructured representation, then the brain 
would have to be able to store and token unique representations for every single thought a 
given person is capable of entertaining. Given that this number is bound to be inordinately 
large, in seems implausible to suppose that the brain has the storage capacity to 
independently represent each and every possible thought. For example, storing separate 
representations for each of MARY LOVES JOHN AND PAUL, MARY LOVES JOHN, MARY LOVES 
PAUL, JOHN LOVES PAUL AND MARY and so forth is much more cognitively expensive that 
storing four representations for JOHN, MARY, PAUL, and LOVES, plus a set of combination rules 
that apply to all representations. Overall, then, a compositionality criterion is favored by 
considerations of productivity, systematicity, and cognitive economy. It is thus no surprise 
that so many theorists think concepts must compositional.  
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 Some caveats are in order before proceeding. First, I do not wish to commit to the 
idea that a simple concept always contributes the same content to every complex concept of 
which it is a part (see Aydede, 1998). One reason to resist this understanding of 
compositionality emerges from a consideration of thoughts involving analogical relations. 
Consider the concepts DOG SHOW and DOG TIRED. The former roughly means an event where 
people enter their canines into various competitions, while the latter roughly means ‘tired like 
a sleepy pet dog.’ And clearly, the concept DOG contributes different contents in each case: 
there is nothing related to the relative wakefulness of dogs contained in the concept DOG 
SHOW, and there is nothing related to the various tricks dogs can perform in the concept DOG 
TIRED.  A second reason can be extracted from Murphy’s (2002) somewhat related discussion 
of noun-pairs like BOATHOUSE and HOUSEBOAT (p. 445). Put simply, if BOAT and HOUSE 
contribute the same content to both compounds, then the contents of BOATHOUSE and 
HOUSEBOAT would be identical, which is clearly false. Therefore, either HOUSE or BOAT (or 
both) contributes different contents to each compound.  
 The second caveat is that is that I do not wish to take a stand here on what constitutes 
a primitive concept (i.e. a concept that cannot be decomposed into any constituent sub-
concepts). It might, for instance, be that lexical concepts are primitive (e.g. Fodor, 1998), or 
it might be that perceptual representations play the role of primitives and can be shared 
amongst numerous concepts (e.g. Barsalou, 1999). The reason for remaining neutral on this 
issue is that doing otherwise would in some sense presuppose an account of concept 
structure. This, in turn, would introduce an element of circularity into any evaluation of a 






1.2.6 Neural Plausibility 
 Since I am arguing that concepts are a particular type of content-bearing neural 
vehicle, and since any account that assumes materialism has to relate concepts to brain 
activity, I take neural plausibility to be an important consideration. There are a number of 
different dimensions on which this criterion can be explicated. First, there are what one might 
call computational considerations. To give one example, if a theory requires an occurent 
perceptual representation to be compared to thousands or millions of stored concepts in order 
to be categorized, then it’s likely that the theory is computationally infeasible given how 
quickly categorization occurs and how quickly neurons transmit information to one another. 
To give another example, if combing two concepts requires combining every single 
representation that could possibly be associated with either one, then the theory is again 
infeasible, because it is implausible to suppose that the brain carries out such an enormous 
number of unique binding operations for every simple case of conceptual combination.  
 Second, there are what might be called resource considerations. If, for example, one’s 
theory entails that each concept requires millions of dedicated neurons, then there simply 
would not be enough neurons in the brain to support a normal range of human conceptual 
capacities. Likewise, if one’s theory requires that the neural vehicle underlying a particular 
concept have direct links to a high number of other vehicles, then the theory may or may not 
be plausible depending on what is known about the interconnectivity of actual neurons.    
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 Lastly, I take the presence of a highly biologically plausible example of implemented 
conceptual processing to count strongly in theory’s favor, all else being equal. This is 
potentially relevant in the present context because the theory of content I employ very clearly 
ascribes meaning to groups of individually spiking neurons. To the best of my knowledge, 
aside from Eliasmith (forthcoming), there is no existing work that gives an account of 
conceptual structure specified in terms of the functional properties of individual neurons. 
Thus, any theory that can plausibly describe how conceptual processing takes place in the 
brain with such a high degree of biological detail is at a serious advantage over competitors 
that rely, for instance, on neural network models (e.g. Rogers & McLelland, 2004) or on 
models derived from fMRI data (e.g. Barsalou et al., 2003, 2008). 
 
1.3 Conclusion  
 To conclude, I have articulated what I take to be the guiding criteria for a good theory 
of concepts. These criteria are based on satisfying explanatory targets derived from data on 
such things as the scope, use, and content of those things concepts are often pre-theoretically 
taken to be. In what follows, I primarily use an independently motivated account of 
representational content to formulate a theory of concept structure that I think satisfies these 








Evaluating Existing Theories of Concepts 
2.1 Introduction 
 The widespread interest in the study of concepts that I mentioned at the start of the 
previous chapter is not the consequence of an absence of well-described theories. On the 
contrary, there are many existing accounts of concept structure, each of which can list a 
collection of explanatory successes in its favor. Though no single theory has achieved 
widespread acceptance, some scholars firmly advocate for one specific variant while others 
have suggested ‘mixed’ or ‘dual’ theories as a strategy to overcome some of the explanatory 
shortcomings that a favored account possesses when considered in isolation (see e.g. 
Murphy, 2002; Laurence & Margolis, 1999; Margolis & Laurence, 2005 for discussion). This 
latter possibility of theoretical pluralism, in particular, raises the question of whether or not 
there is even a need for a novel approach to the problem of concept structure.   
 In what follows, I argue that the main existing theories of concepts cannot satisfy the 
explanatory goals set out in the previous chapter, regardless of whether these theories are 
considered individually or in a mixed form. More specifically, I consider classical views that 
identify concepts with definitions, similarity-based views that identify concepts with 
prototypes or exemplars, theory-based views that identify concepts with their inferential role, 
and atomistic views that identify concepts with unstructured mental symbols that enter into 
nomic relations with their referents. Given the diversity with of the views just mentioned 
(and for the sake of brevity), I restrict my discussion to representative accounts and do not 
comprehensively survey the space of possible theories. Finally, while many of the criticisms 
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examined below have already been widely discussed in the existing literature, I offer novel 
evaluations in some cases.  
 
2.2 Classical Views 
 Until roughly the middle of the twentieth century, the default view amongst 
philosophers and psychologists was that concepts are structured as definitions. Definitions, in 
turn, are sets of features that specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
for the proper application of a concept (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). The concept BROTHER, 
for example, can be defined as MALE SIBLING, and therefore applies only to those things that 
are both males and siblings. It is important to note that such definitions are constituted by 
other concepts, which in turn have definitions of their own; SIBLING, for instance, might be 
defined as PERSON WITH SHARED PARENTS.  Eventually, though, most theorists take this 
definitional regress to reveal a stock of primitive concepts that cannot be structurally 
decomposed any further (Fodor et al., 1980; Laurence & Margolis, 1999; Prinz, 2002). These 
primitive representations can alternately be characterized as perceptual (which yields an 
empiricist version of the classical view), or as innate (which yields a nativist version). So, 
while there are variations on the specific way in which a definitional view6 of concept 
structure gets articulated, the common theme is this: concepts are composed of mental 
representations that jointly determine reference through the specification of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for category membership.  
                                                     
6 “Definitional views” and “classical views” are used interchangeably throughout. 
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 Given as much, the well-known explanatory advantages of classical views are 
apparent. First of all, the publicity criterion is easily accounted for by the fact that different 
people can learn the same definitions (Fodor, 1998; Prinz, 2002; Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Second, categorization can be explained as the matching of an entity with a particular 
concept’s definition (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). For instance, if something is obviously 
male and obviously a sibling, then one can categorize it as a brother provided that one knows 
the relevant definition. The content criterion can be handled in a similar manner: the defining 
features of a concept specify what it refers to (Prinz, 2002; Smith & Medin, 1981), while 
distinct but co-extensive definitions may ascribe different properties to the same things. 
Finally, the compositionality criterion also seems to be satisfiable considering that the 
definitions of complex concepts are constituted by sub-concepts, each of which may or may 
not be constituted by further sub-concepts (Fodor, 1998). Accordingly, the content of a 
complex concept is a function of the contents of its defining sub-parts. The classical 
approach to structure, in all, is favored by a tidy explanation of categorization, 
compositionality, publicity and, most notably, reference.  
 Despite the neatness of this story, definitional views of concepts are now widely 
disregarded (Murphy, 2002; Laurence & Margolis, 1999). One common criticism stems from 
a well-documented lack of success in coming up with workable definitions for many simple 
concepts. Wittgenstein (1953) famously illustrated that GAME has nothing close to a set of 
defining features. Rather, the concept applies to a range of activities sharing what he calls a 
“family resemblance” or a “complicated network of similarities” (p. 171). Ping-pong and 
solitaire, for instance, are different enough to avoid being encapsulated by a single definition, 
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yet they also share certain attributes, such as the requirement of skill and the production of 
amusement. Given that proposed definitions for both abstract concepts like KNOWLEDGE 
(e.g., Gettier, 1963) and mundane concepts like FURNITURE (e.g., Laurence & Margolis, 
1999) have been continually refuted with counter examples, the point to draw here is that 
classical views have had a tough time meeting the scope requirement (Prinz, 2002).7 It might 
be that we simply have yet to find the right definitions, but induction from numerous 
examples of failed conceptual analysis favors the conclusion that there simply are no 
successful definitions to be found. 
 The main objection to classical views, however, stems from their failure to account 
for large swaths of empirical data regarding categorization. The typicality effects discovered 
by Rosch and her colleagues (1976, 1978) simply are not predicted when concepts are 
structured as definitions.  Nor is the tendency for subjects to categorize objects at what Rosch 
(1978) calls the “basic level of abstraction” (p. 192), or an intermediate level in a 
taxonomical hierarchy. In the case of a kitchen chair, for instance, the category chair is more 
salient than furniture or kitchen chair, even though all three apply (Rosch, 1978). This effect 
is also manifested when subjects are engaged in production tasks. When asked to describe a 
kitchen chair, subjects list features of chairs in general, rather than features unique to the 
specific chair type (Rosch, 1978).  The reason, more generally, why classical views fail to 
satisfy these varied empirical requirements is because a definitional structure treats all 
                                                     
7 One response to this criticism is to suggest that concepts have disjunctive definitions. 
Wittgenstein (1953) rejects this proposal on the grounds that such specifications are 
unnecessary for the regulation of concept use, while Smith and Medin (1981) note that the 
characterization of definitions as sets of necessary and sufficient features excludes the 




category members equivalently (Laurence & Margolis, 1999; Murphy, 2002). For example, if 
both a robin and ostrich satisfy the definition of BIRD, then one would have no reason on a 
classical view to expect them to be treated differently in categorization tasks. Yet, subjects 
perform more quickly when answering questions like “Is a robin a bird” than when 
answering questions like “Is an ostrich a bird” and robins are rated as good examples of a 
bird, while ostriches are rated as poor examples (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1973). These 
results, along with others of a similar nature, indicate that concepts must encode more than 
just a set of defining conditions for correct application. Accordingly, definitional views just 
do not seem to be up to the task of meeting the categorization criterion.  
 There are two rebuttals to this conclusion that a classical theorist might invoke. First, 
if one assumes categorization involves a process of feature matching computations, then it is 
possible for some typicality effects to be explained through reference to definitional 
complexity (Smith & Medin, 1981). On this view, complex definitions yield longer 
processing times because more features have to be matched together in order to achieve a 
categorization judgment. The unfortunate consequence of this approach is that typical 
category members have to have simpler definitions than atypical ones. No evidence suggests 
that this is the case, as Laurence and Margolis (1999) note.  
The second response involves postulating a “dual” model wherein concepts have a 
prototype structure for quick identification procedures, and a definitional core for more 
contemplative acts of categorization (Laurence & Margolis, 1999; Murphy, 2002; Smith & 
Medin, 1981). The problem here, however, is that one can think of this move as yielding the 
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worst of both worlds. In addition to the difficulties associated with definitions in general,8 
one inherits all of the problems associated with prototypes at the same time, such as those 
involving compositionality (see below). Accordingly, it is not clear that much is purchased 
with the proposal of a dual theory.  
With respect to meeting the content criterion, definitions show promise. For example, 
the ability for multiple co-extensive definitions to ascribe distinct properties to the same 
things seems obvious. Regarding reference, though, problems crop up. As Fodor et al. point 
out (1980), saying that some entity satisfies the defining features of a particular concept 
deflects rather than explains the required notion of reference. If something satisfies BROTHER 
by satisfying MALE and SIBLING, then the classical theorist still owes an explanation of what it 
means to satisfy these sub-concepts (or of what it means to satisfy a primitive, if one follows 
the definitional regress back that far; Prinz, 2002). In the absence of such explanations, 
classical theorists have trouble meeting the content criterion.  
 Compositionality is another area in which definitional views are often thought to have 
a distinct advantage over their competitors. There are reasons to doubt this supposition too, 
though. First, it helps to observe a distinction offered by Laurence and Margolis (1999) 
regarding two general types of model for conceptual structure. On a so-called “containment 
model” (Laurence & Margolis, 1999, p. 5), a complex concept C might have concepts X, Y, 
and Z as component parts such that every tokening of C necessarily involves a tokening of X, 
                                                     
8 Further problems not mentioned thus far include the problem of people not requiring the 
right definitions in order to possess a concept (consider, for instance, a health-related concept 
like DEPRESSION, which was once constituted by erroneous beliefs involving supernatural 
spirits), and the problem of ambiguous category membership, which cannot be accounted for 
with definitions (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). 
 
 22 
Y, and Z. On an “inferential model” (Laurence & Margolis, 1999, p. 5), the component parts 
X, Y, and Z merely stand in some privileged causal relation to C such that the tokening of C 
often produces but does not require the tokening of X, Y, and Z.  
 If definitional views are understood to operate in accordance with a containment 
model, then compositionality problems immediately crop up. Put simply, if C contains X, Y, 
and Z, then C also contains whatever components make up X, Y, and Z, along with the sub-
components that make up the components, and so on. Assuming even a modest definitional 
regress, it is plausible that on this view many ordinary lexical concepts would have to 
‘contain’ hundreds or thousands of sub-concepts. Yet, when one combines, say, LOUD and 
GUITAR to form LOUD GUITAR, it is clear that one is not combining both the definitions of 
LOUD and GUITAR along with all of the further definitions of these definitions. Moreover, 
there are numerous cases in which compound concepts have meanings with no clear relation 
to the definitions of their constituent parts; consider DAILY GRIND or SUNNY DISPOSITION.  A 
consideration of compositionality accordingly reveals the implausibility of the definitional 
view when it is construed as a containment model. 
 One might respond here by favoring an inferential model. However, Quine’s (1953) 
well-known critique of analyticity reveals some problems with this move.9 On an inferential 
model, a concept possesses certain defining inferential relations, and certain non-defining 
inferential relations that vary from person to person (Fodor, 1998). The most apparent way to 
                                                     
9 Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction is often thought to present more general 
problems for classical views of concepts (for a summary, see Laurence & Margolis, 1999), 
but at present, it just worth noting that a critique of analyticity also undercuts the containment 
model just discussed, since the notion of containment being employed likely presupposes an 
analytic relation between a concept and its definition.  
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understand this distinction is to characterize the defining relations as analytic. But, as Quine 
argues, it has yet to be demonstrated that there is a non-circular way of explicating the notion 
of analyticity – arguments that employ ideas like definition, synonymy, meaning, truth 
preservation, or semantic rules either presuppose some notion of analyticity, or fail to 
achieve a robust explanation. For example, to say that ‘bachelors are unmarried’ is true by 
definition does nothing explicate an analytic relation between ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ 
because the notion of definition being employed either presupposes analyticity, or merely 
describes the common linguistic “usage” of the two terms (Quine, 1953, p. 156).  
 The reason the lack of a credible analytic/synthetic distinction poses a problem for the 
compositionality criterion is because if there is no way to determine which inferences are 
defining of a concept, then there is no way to determine how such inferences compose when 
a complex concept is formed. For example, if my concept TALL has, for whatever reason, 
inferential connections to ARROGANT, then my complex concept TALL TREE would also have 
inferential connections to ARROGANT via compositionality. Excluding this bizarre conclusion 
requires characterizing the inference from TALL to ARROGANT as non-defining, but this likely 
cannot be done without an account of analyticity. Moreover, reference becomes a problem if 
ARROGANT is a part of the compositional structure of TALL TREE, because the set of tall trees 
would be empty if arrogance were a necessary condition of membership. Overall, inferential 
models of definitions simply do not compose well in the absence of a clear analytic/synthetic 
distinction. 
 Lastly, on the matter of neural plausibility, it is worth mentioning some empirical 
evidence indicating that definitions are unlikely to be psychologically real. In experiments 
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involving phoneme-monitoring tasks, where subjects are asked to both comprehend a verbal 
statement and listen for the first instance of particular phoneme in it (see e.g. Fodor et al, 
1980; Laurence & Margolis, 1999 for a summary), there is no observable effect of 
definitional complexity. When listening to sentence pairs like “John’s bachelor friend has 
arrived” and “John’s unmarried friend has arrived,” subjects react to the underlined phoneme 
with identical speed, even though it should take longer to understand ‘bachelor’ than 
‘unmarried’ if ‘unmarried’ is part of the definition of ‘bachelor’ (Fodor et al., 1980; Laurence 
& Margolis, 1999). So, while it is plausible that definitional structures could be represented 
in the brain,10 there is no evidence that they actually are.  
 To summarize, then, classical views seem to fall short on almost all criteria necessary 
for a good theory of concepts. The scope criterion remains unsatisfied due to a widespread 
lack of definitions. The categorization criterion remains unsatisfied due to the absence of a 
plausible explanation of typicality effects. The content criterion remains unsatisfied due to 
the lack of a clear explanation of the reference relation between definitional representations 
and their intentional objects. Meeting the compositionality criterion is problematic regardless 
of whether one adopts a containment model or an inferential model. The neural plausibility 
criterion, finally, also remains unsatisfied given the available psychological evidence. With 
only the account of publicity safe from genuine criticism, it is no surprise that very few 
contemporary researchers advocate a classical view. 
 
                                                     
10 See Eliasmith (forthcoming) for an example of a biologically plausible cognitive 
architecture that suggests a way in which some definitional concepts could be represented in 
the brain.  
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2.3 Prototypes and Exemplars  
 Amongst psychologists, the decisive blow against definitional accounts came 
primarily from Rosch’s work on categorization in the 1970’s (Murphy, 2002). In 
consequence, the notion that concepts have a ‘prototype’ structure, or a structure that lists 
typical but not definitive features of category members, became widespread. Prototypes can 
be alternately characterized as lists of variably weighted features, points in a 
multidimensional metric space, or as singular template representations (Smith & Medin, 
1981). The template approach has not been particularly successful due to scope restrictions, 
while the dimensional and feature-based approaches can and often are combined into a single 
“component” approach (Smith & Medin, 1981, p. 164).11  
To given an example of a concept structured as a prototype, consider CAT. CAT might 
be composed of both weighted features and dimensional attributes as follows: PURRS (1.0), 
CHASES MICE (1.0), HAS FUR (0.9), HAS TAIL (0.9), HAS CLAWS (0.9), HAS FOUR LEGS (0.8), 
DISLIKES WATER (0.7), SPEED: RANGE X (0.6), SIZE: RANGE Y (0.5), and so on. To determine 
whether a given thing is a cat, one simply runs a similarity measurement process that matches 
input representations with the feature representations. For every instance of a match, the 
corresponding feature weight is added to an accumulator, and once a critical numerical 
threshold is reached, a positive categorization judgment is made (e.g. any value over 7 might 
be sufficient for the application of CAT).12  On a purely dimensional account, a positive 
                                                     
11 Note too that feature-based and dimensional accounts are mutually translatable, given that 
a dimension can be represented as a graded set of features, and that a feature can be 
represented as a dimension with a binary value range (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
12 A more commonly used, and complex, formula for this similarity computation is as 
follows: Sim(P, I) = af(P ∩ I) –bf(P – I) – cf(I – P) (Smith et al, 1988). The formula 
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categorization judgment is made when an input occupies a location in a metric space that is 
within a minimum threshold distance of the location of the prototype (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
 The explanatory successes of prototype theories are numerous. First of all, prototypes 
can be generated for a wide range of concepts, from natural kinds like BIRD to abstractions 
like ART (Prinz, 2002). This suggests an accommodation of the scope criterion. Second, 
because prototypes are thought to capture statistical regularities in the environment (Murphy, 
2002; Rosch, 1978; Rosch et al, 1976; Smith & Medin, 1981), they are likely to be similar 
across individuals. Fur, for example, is a modal feature of dogs, so all DOG prototypes are 
likely to include FUR on their feature lists.  Third, a wide range of categorization data is 
accounted for by prototypes. Fast categorization, for instance, is explained by the fact that 
fewer feature-matching computations are needed to reach the threshold value when a 
category instance is highly typical (Murphy, 2002; Smith & Medin, 1981). Fourth, content is 
explicable on the following grounds: similarity thresholds determine reference, while diverse 
property ascriptions can be accounted for by the possibility of distinct prototypes 
corresponding to the same category (Prinz, 2002). Finally, Eliasmith (forthcoming) proposes 
a general cognitive architecture that describes prototypes as high-dimensional vectors 
implemented in populations of neurons. This suggests that the neural plausibility criterion 
can also be satisfied. Overall, the prototype structure shows promise, particularly in 
satisfying the categorization criterion that was so devastating to the classical view.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
incorporates measures of the features unique to each of the prototype and the input instance, 
while employing further weighting parameters (a, b, c) and a function (f) to evaluate the 
relative significance of the feature sets. 
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 There are, however, three substantial problems with the prototype thesis. First of all, 
many concepts simply do not have them (Fodor, 1998; Fodor & Lepore, 1996; Laurence & 
Margolis, 1999; Osherson & Smith, 1981; Prinz, 2002). Boolean concepts13 like NOT A CAT, 
for instance, lack prototypes because it is false that the less something is like a cat, the more 
likely it is to exhibit any particular set of features (Fodor, 1998; Fodor & Lepore, 1996). 
Mountains and popsicles, for instance, are highly unlike cats, yet they have essentially 
nothing in common. Moreover, both general and non-referring concepts also lack prototypes 
(Laurence & Margolis, 1999). There is, for instance, no prototypical OBJECT WITH FOUR 
COLORS. Likewise, a brief consideration of the concept INHABITANTS OF SATURN fails to 
identify a set of typical features for its (non-existent) category members. So, while prototypes 
may be better than definitions at meeting the scope criterion, they nonetheless fail to be good 
enough. 
 The second major problem relates to the content criterion. As many scholars have 
pointed out, prototypes do not adequately specify reference (e.g. Armstrong et al, 1983; 
Prinz, 2002). Something can be a diamond, for instance, without satisfying the feature-
matching threshold necessary for the application of DIAMOND; consider a diamond drill bit. 
Likewise, something can possess many of the typical features of diamonds (and therefore 
meet the categorization threshold) without actually being one; consider jewelry made of 
cubic zirconia. The point is that prototypes often mischaracterize the extensions they 
purportedly represent. Note too that this problem can alternately be described as a failure to 
meet the categorization criterion: it is so-called ‘knowledge effects’ that manifest themselves 
                                                     
13 Boolean concepts are concepts involving logical operators like IF, THEN, AND, and OR 
(Fodor & Lepore, 1996). 
 
 28 
when people use their background beliefs about diamonds to dismiss a necklace made of 
cubic zirconia as ‘fake.’ These effects are an important set of data that prototype theories fail 
to explain (see Murphy, 2002). So, because prototypes fail to meet the reference criterion, 
they also encounter problems accurately describing how concepts are applied.  
 The most widely discussed problem for prototypes, however, has to do with 
compositionality. As Fodor and Lepore (1996) note, the prototype for PET FISH is not a simple 
combination of the prototypes for PET and FISH. A typical pet fish is something like a 
goldfish, but a goldfish is neither a typical pet, nor a typical fish (Fodor & Lepore, 1996). 
The more general point is that complex concepts tend to exhibit emergent features that are 
not at all typical of their constituent parts. There is accordingly no simple “composition 
function” that maps constituent prototype features onto a prototype for a complex concept 
(Fodor & Lepore, 1996, p. 254). One possible conclusion to draw here is that the prototypes 
for complex concepts are idioms, or constructions in which compositional semantics get 
overridden by conventions or learning experiences (Fodor & Lepore, 1996). But, idioms do 
not compose, so if prototypes are idioms, then they cannot be concepts.  
 Given the significance of this problem, a number of attempts have been made to 
create a workable model of prototype combination. One early approach was to construe 
prototypes as specifying graded extensions (i.e. typical members of class are more in the 
extension than atypical members). This allows for the characterization of complex concepts 
as representations of the intersection of a series of fuzzy sets (see Osherson & Smith, 1981). 
A BLUE BOOK prototype, for example, might take the minimum of the degrees to which 
something is blue and a book, and then produce a positive categorization judgment in the 
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event that this minimum is above a certain threshold. Put more specifically, if something is 
blue to degree 0.6 and a book to degree 0.2, then it will be judged to be a blue book to degree 
0.2 (Laurence & Margolis, 1999).  
 However, as Osherson and Smith (1981) demonstrate, the fuzzy set approach yields 
erroneous predictions. If a pet guppy is deemed a fish to a degree of 0.7 and a pet to a degree 
of 0.6, then the natural conclusion to draw is that a guppie is a pet fish to a degree of 0.6. 
Guppies, though, are a prototypical pet fish, and should accordingly be included in the 
extension of PET FISH to a very high degree. Perhaps to a degree of 0.8 or 0.9. Moreover, 
depending on the categorization threshold for PET FISH, the fuzzy set approach might even 
result in one failing to identify the guppy correctly. It is accordingly clear that models 
appealing to the intersection of graded extensions cannot offer a robust explanation of 
prototype combination. 
 A more recent solution to the problem involves what is called a ‘selective 
modification model’ (Smith et al, 1988; see Murphy, 2002). Explicated only in terms of 
noun-adjective combinations, the model proposes that a complex concept is formed when 
features of an adjective prototype modify and reweight features of a noun prototype. Or, 
more specifically: 
Each attribute in the adjective concept selects the corresponding attribute in the noun 
concept; then for each selected attribute in the noun, there is an increase in the 
salience (or votes) of the value given in the adjective, as well as an increase of the 
diagnosticity of the attribute. (Smith et al, 1988, p. 360) 
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To cash this out with an example, consider the combination of SHRIVELED and APPLE. The 
suggestion is that APPLE contains an attribute for texture, and that SHRIVELLED boosts the 
diagnosticity of this attribute while shifting votes onto the ‘bumpy’ value from the ‘smooth’ 
value (Smith et al, 1988). 
 The problems with the selective modification model are threefold. First, there is lack 
of scope (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). Many complex concepts incorporate much more than 
simple noun-adjective pairings, and it is unclear how the model could generalize to cover 
such cases. Second, as Murphy (2002) points out, it is not the case that adjectives select 
dimensions14 to modify in a clear or consistent manner. Consider the concepts CORPORATE 
LAWYER and CORPORATE DONATION. For the latter, the adjective likely modifies a dimension 
like ‘received from __,’ whereas for the former, the adjective likely modifies a dimension 
like ‘works for __’ (Murphy, 2002). A systematic mapping function between the features of 
adjectives and nouns is accordingly unlikely to be found. Third, even if there were some way 
of determining such a function, its existence would require nouns to actually possess all of 
the features that they could possibly have modified. This in turn would require every noun 
prototype to contain every feature that could be modified by any adjective. Representational 
economy accordingly goes out the window, perhaps along with neural plausibility.   
 Altogether, prototypes exhibit only marginal improvements on the shortcomings of 
the classical view. They lack the scope necessary to support the known range of human 
concept types, and they lack an adequate account of conceptual content. Most decisively, 
                                                     
14 What Smith et al (1988) call ‘attributes,’ Murphy (2002) calls ‘dimensions’.  
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they fail to accommodate the compositionality criterion in any persuasive manner. 
Prototypes, in short, cannot be successful candidates for a theory of concepts.  
  I’ll only briefly discuss exemplar views. Because they share many of the same 
features as prototype theories, they also share most of the same problems.15 The main 
difference is that instead of explaining categorization through matching inputs to summary 
representations, exemplar views suggest that categorization occurs through the matching of 
inputs to representations of previously perceived category instances (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
An advantage obtained with this approach is that one can explain things like the tendency for 
people to exhibit proficiency when categorizing familiar but atypical instances of a given 
category, along with a variety of other so-called ‘exemplar effects’ (see Murphy, 2002).16 A 
further advantage is that exemplar views may also improve on prototype views with respect 
to scope. One’s NOT A CAT concept, for instance, could be comprised of example 
representations of mountains and popsicles. Likewise, a set of example representations of 
things like four colored flags could constitute the structure of OBJECTS WITH FOUR COLORS.  
 These apparent improvements merely distract from familiar problems involving 
content, categorization, and compositionality. First, exemplars cannot adequately specify 
reference for the simple reason that any given set of example representations cannot 
encompass the entire extension of a concept. To illustrate, the average person’s experiences 
with instances of birds is unlikely to yield an exemplar that matches with penguins and 
                                                     
15 In fact, on some accounts, exemplars just are prototypes at a subordinate level in a 
taxonomical hierarchy. For example, a prototype representation of a robin can be understood 
as the same thing as an exemplar representation of bird (e.g. Rosch, 1978). 
16 Typicality effects are also accounted for by the fact that one is more likely to store 
exemplars of highly typical category members (see Smith & Medin, 1981 and Prinz, 2002) 
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ostriches. And even if a given individual’s experiences of birds do include penguins and 
ostriches, then there is still the problem of cases of the sort described by Keil (1989), where, 
say, a fish is disguised to look like a swimming penguin, or a swimming penguin is disguised 
to look like a fish. The more general, content-related difficulty shared by prototypes and 
exemplars is that both can refer only to what they are taken to refer to (Prinz, 2002). 
Misrepresentation is impossible: anything that meets the similarity threshold for a given 
concept is, by necessity, a member of the concept’s extension. I take this to be a decisive 
point against both types of theory. 
 Compositionality, if anything, is worse for exemplars than prototypes. It seems, for 
instance, impossible to generate a representation of a pet fish from exemplars of pets and 
exemplars of fish. Which pet exemplar gets paired with which fish exemplar? And, more 
specifically, why think that any features associated with a given pet exemplar (e.g. a dog, a 
cat, or a parrot) ought to be relevant to the generation of a representation of a pet fish?17 The 
problem is that emergent features in PET FISH (e.g. ‘lives in a tank’) are inexplicable when a 
standard composition function is applied to exemplar representations of pets and fish. 
Moreover, even if one was willing to concede that exemplars or prototypes somehow contain 
such emergent content as part of their structure, neural plausibility likely goes out the 
window. Attaching all of the possible content that could emerge as a result of a given 
concept’s inclusion in a complex construction to the structure of the concept would, quite 
simply, result in inordinately large concepts. Consider the variety of emergent features in 
                                                     
17 Note that appealing to a pet fish as a pet exemplar is circular. Alternatively, claiming that 
pet fish prototypes or exemplars are generated through learning experiences with pet fish 
reduces PET FISH to an idiom, and idioms are not compositional (Fodor & Lepore, 1996)  
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such concepts as PET BIRD, PET ROCK, PET PROJECT, PET PEEVE, TEACHER’S PET, PET SITTER, 
PET STORE, PET GROOMING, PETTING ZOO, and so forth. If PET had to contain all of these 
potentially emergent features, PET would be massive.18 Assuming an inference model rather 
than a containment model might mitigate the problem, but in this case, concerns regarding 
the selection of the right inferences by a composition function come to the fore again. 
Exemplars, overall, do little to succeed where prototypes fail.  
 
2.4 Theory Theory 
 In tandem with the ongoing development of prototype and exemplar views, the idea 
that concepts are structured like miniature theories of the categories they denote has become 
an increasingly popular target of psychological research (see Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 
1985; Prinz, 2002). The basic insight prompting this development is that individuals possess 
beliefs about things like causal relations, essences, and ontological distinctions that seem to 
influence how they form and use concepts (Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Prinz, 2002; 
Rogers & McLelland, 2004). For example, the reason why BIRD denotes a coherent category 
and groups entities in the way that it does is because many of the features shared by most 
birds (such as flight, wings, feathers, and hollow bones) are related to one another via a set of 
one or more explanations: birds can fly because they have wings, feathers, along with hollow 
bones; and birds fly because doing so helps them gather food and avoid predators (Murphy, 
2002; Rogers & McLelland, 2004). So, the benefit of describing BIRD as a miniature theory of 
                                                     
18 It is possible that this degree of representational complexity could be incorporated into a 
prototype or an exemplar model if the various features of a given prototype or exemplar are 
accessed through transformations of a single representation (see Chapter 3). 
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birds is that one gains an explanation of why certain features of birds are deemed relevant or 
salient in the formation of the category,19 and of how the attributes characteristic of category 
members are related to one another (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Neither of these virtues are 
present in the explanations provided by prototype, exemplar, and classical theorists.  
  Some clarity is required regarding the exact nature of the account of concept structure 
being proposed by theory theorists. Given that concepts are alternately referred to as theories 
and as being embedded in theories, the nature of the relationship being proposed between the 
two is not always clear (Fodor, 1998; Laurence & Margolis, 1999; Prinz, 2002). The general 
consensus amongst philosophers, however, is to characterize the thesis as one suggesting that 
concepts are representations individuated by the role they play in a theory constituted by a set 
of concepts and the inferential relations that hold amongst them (Fodor, 1998; Laurence & 
Margolis, 1999; Prinz, 2002). Thus, to take an arbitrary example, JAR would be a singular 
representation whose content is defined by its place in inferential schema20 involving other 
concepts like CONTAINER, SEALED LID, USED FOR STORAGE, PRESERVES PERISHABLES, and so 
on. The essential difference between this account and, say, a prototype view that lists some of 
the same concepts on a feature list is that the nature of the relations between the features is 
accounted for by the inferences that make up the explanatory schema – a jar is used for 
storage, for instance, because it is a container, and it has a sealed lid so as to be of use in 
                                                     
19 The standard explanation of category formation is that categories latch onto kinds that 
exhibit clusters of similar properties while lacking properties that are highly typical of other 
such clusters. However, this is rather uninformative given that “any two entities can be 
arbitrarily similar or dissimilar by changing the criterion of what counts as a relevant 
attribute” (Murphy & Medin, 1985, p. 428).   
20 It is not generally supposed that a mental ‘theory’ is of comparable scope to a proper 
scientific theory. Rather, the term ‘theory’ refers to any minimally sophisticated explanatory 
framework or schema. Hence, ‘explanatory schema’ and ‘theory’ are used interchangeably. 
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preserving perishables. Accordingly, the inferences warranted by one’s JAR concept serve to 
individuate JAR while also collectively forming a general explanatory account of what jars 
are.  
 There are a number of benefits afforded by indentifying the structure of a concept 
with inferential role in this manner. First of all, scope is handled fairly easily given that just 
about any concept one can think of can be matched with some sort of mental schema. For 
example, the fact that we can understand concepts like SUM and CENTAUR indicates that we 
must have some sort of explanatory account of what it takes for something to be a sum or a 
centaur. Second, theory-based views arguably provide the best account of categorization yet 
discussed. Knowledge effects are handled via the numerous inferences that a concept 
embedded in a theory licenses. For example, Murphy (2002) discusses an experiment 
conducted by Lance Rips in which subjects were asked to categorize transformed animals 
(e.g., a small bird exposed to toxic chemicals that cause it to lose its feathers and develop 
thin, transparent wings that make it look highly similar to an insect). The theory theory 
explains the tendency for subjects to still categorize the creature as bird because it allows 
BIRD to have inferential connections to some sort of notion of ‘bird essence’ that stipulates 
that things with bird innards born of bird parents always remain birds. The relation between 
parentage and essence, in other words, is an explanatory relation captured by a theory rather 
than a feature list or definition. Third, neural plausibility might also be handled on some 
models of conceptual processing. Rogers & McLelland (2004), for instance, describe a 
connectionist model called the “parallel distributed processing framework” that can arguably 
implement the type of conceptual system described by theory theories (p. 49). Likewise, 
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Eliasmith’s (forthcoming) account of a biologically plausible cognitive architecture proposes 
a manner in which concepts that include inferential connections can be implemented in 
populations of spiking neurons.  Overall, then, the theory theory is initially favored by a 
promising account of scope, categorization, and neural plausibility. 
 A common complaint against theory theories is that they cannot meet the publicity 
criterion. Fodor (1998), for instance, argues that when theory theorists claim that concepts 
are constituted by their place in the theories in which they are embedded, they are simply 
reiterating the central tenet of inferential role semantics. And inferential role semantics, 
Fodor contends, presents an unfavorable dilemma to the concept theorist. Either all of the 
inferential relations a given concept possesses are relevant to the determination of its content, 
or only some are. If all the relations are relevant (i.e. holism is true), then no one shares the 
same concepts because everyone’s total set of mental representations is unique. Hence, 
concept publicity is impossible if one chooses this horn of the dilemma. And if only some of 
the inferences are content determining (i.e. molecularism is true), then the theory theorist 
needs say which ones. Doing so has been proven to be problematic given the aforementioned 
challenges faced by accounts that specify defining inferences (i.e. classical views) or 
characteristic inferences (i.e. prototype and exemplar views). So, opting for the other horn of 
the dilemma only benefits the theory theorist if he or she has some sort of account of which 
set of inferences or ‘theory’ one needs to have in order to possess a given concept. Fodor’s 
(1998) complaint is that no such account has been given.  
 I think this evaluation is problematic. First of all, if one opts for holism, strict concept 
identity is likely just too high of a burden to impose. Stating that two people have distinct 
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CAT concepts simply because each representation possesses different inferential relations by 
virtue of being in a unique cognitive system ignores the fact that the concepts might 
nonetheless have highly similar inferential roles. Suppose one person infers USUALLY MEAN 
AND ALOOF from CAT, while a different person infers USUALLY FRIENDLY AND PLAYFUL. So 
long as many of the other inferences deriving from each person’s cat concept are identical, it 
is very reasonable to suppose that the two individuals can effectively communicate when 
talking to one another about cats. To the extent that they do not, I would argue that a certain 
degree of misunderstanding is commonplace in human interactions, and that a theory of 
concepts (if tied to language use) ought to anticipate and accommodate this fact. Finally, to 
address the obvious concern about what constitutes sufficient similarity for mutual concept 
possession, I think that there is a simple pragmatic benchmark that can be invoked: one 
possesses a concept (such as CAT) insofar as one is able make oneself understood when using 
this concept in communicating with other individuals in the same discursive community. 
Communicative efficacy relativized to a specific context, in other words, is likely sufficient 
for concept possession.21 More argumentation will offered in support of this claim in chapter 
three. 
If one opts for molecularism instead of holism, the problem of specifying which 
inferences are the constitutive ones can be solved in a nearly identical way. Inferences that 
                                                     
21 This probably entails some mild form of conceptual relativism between communities and 
temporal periods. But given that children can understand adults, adults can understand 
children, non-native speakers of language can understand native speakers, modern readers 
can understand medieval authors, and so on, I think that cases of incommensurable concepts 





are highly important for achieving communicative efficacy are constitutive of content, while 
ones that are not communicatively important are not constitutive of content. For example, if 
possessing the inference from GLASS to IS TRANSPARENT or USED FOR MAKING WINDOWS is 
important for one to understand what other people mean when they talk about glass,22 then 
these inferences are likely content determining. In contrast, the inference from GLASS to 
WHAT UNCLE BARRY MAKES HIS CRAFTS OUT OF in unlikely to be important for understanding 
discourse involving glass-talk, and hence unlikely to be content determining. Overall, these 
(albeit brief) arguments suggest a natural solution to the problem of publicity for theory 
theories provided that one abandons the requirement of strict concept identity.  
 This solution, however, highlights a further complaint regarding the content criterion. 
Laurence and Margolis (1999), for example, suggest that reference is underspecified by 
theory theories because if we concede that the same concept can be embedded in slightly 
different explanatory schemas across individuals, then each individual’s version of the 
concept will necessarily pick out a slightly different extension. It is also possible for an 
individual to possess a mistaken theory, in which case their concept picks out the wrong 
extension (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). Moreover, given that the theory associated with a 
given concept essentially constitutes the set of properties it ascribes to its intentional objects, 
difficulties also emerge for the aspect of content that deals with property ascription. Saving 
publicity, in short, might come at the cost of losing a clean account of content.  
                                                     
22 The relevant notion of “understanding” being employed here could operationalized in 
terms the generation of predominantly successful behavioral predictions. For example, if you 
tell me you are going to buy glass at the hardware store, I understand your use of the concept 
GLASS to the extent that I am able to predict what you end up doing (in the absence of 
extenuating circumstances).   
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Again, though, a plausible solution to these problems can be sketched out. If one 
entertains the proposal that concept possession is a matter of communicative efficacy 
relativized to a context, then an important entailment follows. Namely, concept possession 
becomes a matter of degree, ranging from some sort of minimal competency (e.g., that of a 
child first learning the concept BACTERIA) to a height of maximal expertise (e.g., that of a 
renowned bacteriologist). The extension of BACTERIA, on this view, is the class of entities 
picked out by our best scientific account of what it takes for something to be a bacterium. It 
is possible, of course, that something could be a bacterium even if no one thought so, but any 
attempt to accommodate this fact into an account of reference would essentially make the 
proper extension of BACTERIA epistemically inaccessible. So, provided that one takes the best 
available account of a concept to specify the best approximation of its extension, then the 
matter of reference is largely cleared up. Non-experts and those with minimal competency 
may make mistakes and misrepresent regularly, but insofar as they are communicatively 
efficacious (and responsive to reasoning) then they can have their concepts revised and 
updated through discourse with the more competent. Again, these comments are merely 
suggestive, but I think they show promise, especially given that they are consistent with the 
notion that concepts are regularly modified and revised through debate and scholarly 
investigation. 
In fact, I only identify three shortcomings with the theory theory. The first is that it is 
underspecified. Proponents of the view typically fail to offer a concrete model or set of 
mechanisms showing how it could implement some sort of basic conceptual processing 
(Rogers & McLelland, 2004); simply stating that a concept’s structure is determined by its 
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inferential role is not particularly illuminating or explanatory. The second problem is that 
there is no natural explanation of typicality and exemplar effects. And the third problem is 
that in the absence of a more clear and precise account of how inferential role individuates a 
concept, the matter of how concepts compose is left unaddressed. Presumably, theories do 
not just sum together to produce a characterization of the inferential role of a complex 
concept – emergent attributes of the sort discussed in the section above on prototype 
combination have to be accounted for in some way. Explaining how the inferences that 
characterize sub-concepts are modified and combined when conjoined to form a complex 
concept is accordingly a goal that a fully fleshed account ought to strive for.  
 Altogether, while the theory theory in its standard guises fails to meet all six of the 
explanatory criteria, it does offer a number of important insights. First, any account of 
concept structure that can meet the categorization criterion is likely going to have to 
incorporate explanatory beliefs to some extent; otherwise, knowledge effects will remain a 
problem. Second, the accounts of content and publicity suggested above provide a sketch for 
how any theory that accommodates knowledge effects might be able meet these criteria. 
Overall, concepts are probably not embedded in theories as described by researchers like Keil 
(1989) and Murphy and Medin (1985), but it seems clear that this approach comes the closest 
of any account discussed thus far to hitting the explanatory mark. 
 
2.5 Informational Atomism 
 One feature common to all of the theories that have been discussed up to this point is 
the assumption that concepts are structurally complex. Atomistic views, in contrast, start with 
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the assumption that most, if not all, lexical concepts are completely unstructured (e.g. Fodor, 
1998). This is a controversial position not widely held amongst psychologists or philosophers 
(Fodor, 1998; Laurence & Margolis, 2002), but it is worth briefly discussing given some of 
the issues it highlights.  
 The central motivations for informational atomism are its accounts of reference and 
compositionality. Compositionality, at first glance, is handled simply. Because concepts are 
atoms, complex concepts are simply structured groups of such atoms, and the contents of the 
structures are accordingly a function of the contents of their parts. Content, in turn, is 
determined by law-like mind/world relations that obtain between unstructured 
representations and their intentional objects (Fodor, 1998). The best way understand these 
‘nomic’ relations is to view them as counterfactual supporting causal links between some 
property P and the tokening of some concept C: P’s reliably cause C’s to be tokened (Prinz, 
2002). And as should be clear, nomic relations are also what enable Fodor to meet the 
reference requirement. Because C’s are reliable indicators of P’s, C refers to P.  
The most interesting feature of this characterization of reference is that it includes an 
explanation of misrepresentation, something few if any of the previously examined theories 
touched on. Because concepts do not refer to only to those things that reliably cause their 
tokenings, some explanation must be given for why only certain nomic relations are the ones 
that determine reference (Eliasmith, 2000). Consider, for instance, that on dark nights, foxes 
might reliably cause DOG tokenings given the close resemblance between the two types of 
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animal (Adams & Aizawa, 2010).23 Fodor’s (1987) solution to this problem is to propose that 
the fox/DOG relation is asymmetrically dependent on the dog/DOG relation. The reason, in 
other words, that DOG does not refer to foxes is because the nomic relation between DOG and 
foxes would not exist if the nomic relation between DOG and dogs did not exist. 
Misrepresentation is accordingly the result of concepts having multiple, asymmetrically 
dependent nomic links to external entities. 
 Other benefits of informational atomism are evident too. Scope is easily handled by 
stipulating that every lexical concept has a dedicated symbol, and publicity follows trivially 
from the fact that if people share the same symbols, then they also share the same concepts. 
The property ascription aspect of content is accounted for by the possibility of the symbols of 
different formal types possessing the same intentional objects (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). 
Categorization, finally, is addressed by distinguishing between detection mechanisms and the 
actual concepts they activate (Fodor, 1998). Because such detection mechanisms vary widely 
between individuals (e.g some people are blind), and because they are not compositional, 
Fodor claims that they are not part of the structure of a concept. The way to deal with 
categorization effects, in short, is to shift the burden of explaining them off of the concept 
theorist.  
 Not surprisingly, many theorists have complained that this approach renders concepts 
explanatorily impotent (see Laurence & Margolis, 1999). If a theory of concepts does not 
account for categorization data, then an explanation of this data must be provided elsewhere. 
                                                     
23 In the literature, this is referred to as the “disjunction problem,” or the problem of ensuring 
that a concept like DOG doesn’t refer to all of its potential causes such DOG means ‘dog’ or 
‘fox on dark night’ or ‘dog statue’ or ‘large cat’ and so on (Fodor, 1987).  
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However, given that there are currently no theoretical candidates aside from concepts for 
explaining such data, informational atomism has the unfortunate consequence of reducing the 
overall explanatory power of any particular theory of mind into which it is incorporated. 
Another big problem is that no explanation is given of how the asymmetric dependency 
relations underlying Fodor’s account of reference are actually determined (Eliasmith, 2000). 
It is possible to appeal to things like naming ceremonies, learning histories, and evolutionary 
functions, but Fodor makes no effort to elucidate matters on this front, so it remains unclear 
that he has actually provided an explanation as opposed to a description of the dependencies 
that exist amongst nomic relations (Eliasmith, 2000). A further concern is that asymmetric 
dependency relations create compositionality problems (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). If the 
reference of a concept is determined by its asymmetric dependency relations, then the content 
of a complex concept has to partly be a function of the asymmetric dependency relations of 
its constituent parts. But, clearly, the relations that explain how one can misrepresent a fox as 
a pet and a whale as a fish do not combine to create the relations that explain how one can 
misrepresent a minnow in laboratory tank as a pet fish. I take this to be counter-example to 
the idea that atomistic concepts compose easily.  
 Overall, though, the main reason atomistic accounts are held in such poor regard is 
because they entail the innateness of all lexical concepts. Fodor, for example, argues that 
because unstructured concepts are primitive concepts, and because primitive concepts must 
be innate, lexical concepts are therefore innate by virtue of their lack of structure (Fodor, 
1998; for discussion, see Laurence & Margolis, 2002). The reason Fodor thinks lexical 
concepts lack structure is because he disputes that they can be decomposed into definitions, 
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prototypes, or anything else. The reason Fodor thinks that unstructured/primitive concepts 
are innate has to do with his account of concept acquisition. Assuming that hypothesis testing 
is the only available method for learning new concepts, primitive concepts must be unlearned 
because one cannot formulate the relevant hypothesis in any given case unless one already 
possesses the concept. (Fodor, 1998). For example, learning RED by formulating and testing 
the hypothesis “that things fall under RED by virtue of being red” requires that one already 
have RED; otherwise, how could one form the hypothesis (Fodor, 1998, p. 124)? The best 
conclusion to draw, then, is that such concepts are not learned, but rather innate. The 
unfortunate consequence of this argument is that it entails bizarre conclusions like the idea 
that the ancient Greeks possessed concepts such as ASTRONAUT and INTERNET, and the idea 
that we currently possess concepts for things that have yet to be invented and discovered. 
Many scholars accordingly view this radical nativism as a reductio ad absurdum of 
informational atomism (Laurence & Margolis, 2002). I tend to agree with them, and even if I 
did not, it is quite clear that the theory fails to satisfy all six of the necessary criteria. 
Categorization is left unexplained entirely, while the lack of an account of the determining 
factors of asymmetric dependency relations undercuts the ability of the theory to meet the 
content criterion. The fact that asymmetric dependency relations do not compose also 
presents a problem. And, finally, given that scope and publicity follow trivially from 
assigning each lexical concept a unique mental symbol, it’s hard to construe these 
explanatory successes as virtues of informational atomism. Concepts, in all, just cannot be 




2.6 Pluralistic views? 
 As mentioned at the outset, one theoretical approach that has become increasingly 
popular involves the proposal of a pluralistic concept structure. Murphy (2002), for instance, 
favors that conclusion that “people attempt to form prototypes as part of a larger knowledge 
structure” while also retaining exemplar memories (p. 492). Similarly, Laurence and 
Margolis (1999) suggest a preference for combining conceptual atomism with prototype 
theory. The idea, it seems, is to selectively use different theories to satisfy whichever of the 
criteria they most readily accommodate. Dual theories, as mentioned, use cores to satisfy the 
reference and compositionality criteria, and prototypes to satisfy the categorization criterion. 
Adding exemplars and theories in place of cores accordingly might seem like a good way to 
hit most of necessary explanatory targets. Notwithstanding the question of whether such a 
hybrid can actually satisfy the compositionality criterion (theories, recall, do not compose 
well), I think that the point to notice here is that it is not at all clear what sort of structure 
such concepts would actually have. Is a single concept really a gigantic sum of typical feature 
representations, exemplar representations, and causal/explanatory knowledge 
representations? How do these different components connect and relate to one another? 
There are, in short, so many loose ends that it almost seems that hybrid models abandon the 
very question that they were designed to answer. 
 Take the model offered by Laurence and Margolis (1999) as an example. They 
propose a combination of informational atomism and prototype theory whereon conceptual 
cores (i.e. symbols) determine reference, compose, and explain publicity, while prototypes 
account for psychological effects like typicality. There are two problems with this approach. 
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First, none of the challenges associated with prototypes and informational atomism are 
resolved by simply merging the two theories together. For example, neither prototypes nor 
informationally grounded symbols compose well, so there is absolutely no reason to think 
that a concept structured as both a prototype and a symbol would either. Moreover, even if 
one disregards the arguments against the composition of asymmetric dependency relations 
and thereby supposes that symbols do compose well, there is still the problem of explaining 
how the prototypes for complex concepts are generated.24  
 Second, there is no explanation of how the prototype and symbol that make up a 
given concept are related to one another. Presumably, the features that characterize 
prototypes are made up of concepts, but if so, then prototypes would consist of subparts that 
are themselves both symbols and prototypes (and one could naturally think of a prototype as 
a set of symbols). This is a peculiar state of affairs for two reasons. First, it introduces a 
regress that atomistic views are designed to avoid. If a concept is made up of a set of 
symbols, each of which in turn is made up of a set of symbols, then it becomes very difficult 
to demarcate plausible boundaries to the concept’s structure. Second, the view yields 
confusion regarding how symbols are tokened. Presumably, all of the symbols that make up a 
given concept all enter into nomic relations with their referents, yet it would be highly odd if 
the tokening of one conceptual ‘core’ always involved the tokening of other conceptual cores 
simultaneously. This would effectively prohibit the tokening of one concept independently of 
various others. Yet one can presumably token DOG without tokening FUR, even if FUR is a 
                                                     
24 One option for getting around this problem is to suggest that a prototype is not actually 
part of the structure of a concept, but merely an associated representation that aids in 




prominent feature of a dog prototype. I take these points to collectively indicate that a simple 
marriage of existing theories is unlikely to result in a substantially improved account of the 
structure of concepts.  
 
2.7 Conclusion   
 In all, this chapter has served two functions. First, it has provided a brief overview of 
the existing philosophical and psychological literature on concepts while examining many of 
the standard arguments for and against particular theories. Second, it has attempted to 
demonstrate the need for a new approach by highlighting the various challenges that existing 
theories face. The foundation for such an approach, I contend, is to be sought in a correct 
characterization of the representation relation between neural populations and their 
intentional objects. Once this relation is specified, a candidate theory for the structure of 










Dynamic Holism and the Structure of Concepts  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Up to this point, I have gestured repeatedly towards the idea that paying closer 
attention to how representational content is ascribed to neural populations is the key to 
developing a successful account of the structure of concepts. What I have not done is spell 
out the details of this strategy or give much in the way of a description of the proposal it 
entails. The purpose of this chapter, accordingly, is to make the argument from a theory of 
content to a theory of concepts in a way that satisfies the explanatory goals outlined in 
chapter one.  
There are three steps involved. First, I describe the theory of representational content 
being employed and briefly discuss some reasons for preferring it to competing theories. 
Second, I examine a possible method for using this theory of content to scale up from the 
level of basic perceptual representations to the level highly complex conceptual 
representations. One purpose of this section is to situate my proposal more clearly in the 
context of the aforementioned accounts offered by Eliasmith (2000, forthcoming), Barsalou 
(1999, 2003, 2008), and Prinz (2002). Third, I make a detailed case for the view that 
concepts can be identified with representations that bear as their content a set of potential 
transformations that can be used to yield further contents. I refer to this account as “Dynamic 
Holism,” and its essential claims are threefold: first, that concepts are structured dynamically 
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through sets of transformations of a single source representation; second, that the content of a 
concept is specified holistically; and third, that the content of any given concept changes over 
time.  
 
3.2 A Two-Factor Theory of Representational Content 
 Debates over the nature of mental content are widespread in contemporary 
philosophy (see e.g. Adams & Aizawa, 2010; Brown, 2002), and it would accordingly be 
impossible to consider the full range of available theories. For simplicity, I consider three 
general types.25 Causal theories, first of all, propose roughly that mental representations 
mean what they are caused by. Conceptual role theories, in contrast, propose that the 
meaning a mental representation is a consequence of the inferences it licenses. And two-
factor theories, finally, suggest that both causes and conceptual roles are determinants of 
content. In what follows, I briefly summarize the difficulties faced by each family of 
theories, and then outline a set of reasons for adopting a specific two-factor theory of content 
developed by Eliasmith (2000). I also quickly outline some of the technical details of how 
this theory ascribes content to populations of neurons. 
  The problems with causal theories should be familiar from the discussion of 
informational atomism in the previous chapter. In order to avoid the so-called “disjunction 
problem” and provide an explanation of misrepresentation (Fodor, 1987), causal theorists 
have to establish a principled method by which to distinguish between causes that are content 
determining, and causes that are not content determining. I have already articulated some of 
                                                     
25 This threefold division is borrowed from Eliasmith (2000). 
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the challenges involved with appealing to asymmetric dependency relations, and it is likely 
that the other options available to the causal theorist fare just as poorly.  
One could, for instance, postulate a learning period in which a person learns to 
identify content determining causes (Adams & Aizawa, 2010; Eliasmith, 2000). The problem 
here is that becomes extremely difficult to specify when the learning period starts and ends, 
and how the learning actually takes place (Adams & Aizawa, 2010). Another option is to 
propose that evolutionarily determined representational functions pick out content 
determining causes (Eliasmith, 2000). Rabbits, for example, might evolve a dog-representing 
capacity in order to avoid predators. In this case, the problem is that evolving a 
representational capacity that is responsive to both dogs and dog-look-alikes would have 
equal or greater survival value than a capacity that represents dogs alone. If so, then one has 
no principled reason to say that the representational function picks out dogs rather than dog 
look-alikes (Adams & Aizawa, 2010). And since there is nothing unique about this particular 
case, it is fair to suppose that similar difficulties emerge with other examples of evolved 
representational functions. Overall, appropriately handling cases of misrepresentation is a 
challenge for a number of theories that identify content with cause. 
  Conceptual role theories face an unrelated but equally significant challenge: they 
cannot account for truth conditions (Eliasmith, 2000). Because the conceptual role of a 
representation is not stipulated by its causal relation to things in the world, there is no sense 
in which one can distinguish between right and wrong applications of representations with 
the same conceptual role (Eliasmith, 2000). For example, if one’s WATER concept had its 
content determined by the inferences it licenses, there would be no possible way to 
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differentiate between WATER and WATERT, and accordingly no way to decide whether one has 
correctly or incorrectly applied the concept WATER to a clear liquid substance that is 
composed of XYZ (Eliasmith, 2000). To put the complaint in more general terms, a 
conceptual role theory of content cannot distinguish between concepts that apply identical 
properties to distinct referents. This is a clear violation of the explanatory goals outlined in 
chapter one, and I accordingly take any account that identifies content with conceptual role 
alone to be insufficient for the purposes at hand.    
 Two factor theories are troubled by what is sometimes called the ‘alignment 
problem,’ or the problem of ensuring that the truth conditions and conceptual role of a 
representation are consistent with one another (Eliasmith, 2000). As Fodor (1987) articulates 
the challenge, nothing in a standard two-factor theory prevents a mental state from having the 
content “dogs are animals” by virtue of its causal connections to the world, and the content 
“grass is purple” by virtue of is conceptual role (p. 82). There is accordingly a clear need for 
a mechanism that ensures that the content assigned to a representation by its causal 
connections is compatible with the content assigned to it by its conceptual role.  
Helpfully, recent work by Eliasmith (2000) proposes just such a mechanism. If one 
reasonably assumes that neural populations are the vehicles of mental representations, then 
one can conjoin the relevant external causes of a representation with its conceptual role by 
describing both in terms of the same functional properties of a single group of neurons. Put 
another way, the postulation of an underlying neurocomputational factor arguably unifies 
causal and conceptual role factors under a single description and thereby has the benefit of 
eliminating the alignment problem. A further benefit of this approach is that it has been 
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successfully employed in modeling neural systems (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003), and 
accordingly exhibits some predictive and explanatory adequacy in practical contexts. I take 
this combination of theoretical and practical virtues to constitute a strong reason for adopting 
a two-theory of content for the remainder of this essay. In general, I adopt the theory of 
content described and used in a modeling approach known as the “Neural Engineering 
Framework” or NEF (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003), but little aside from the discussion of the 
neural plausibility and content criteria depends upon this specific choice. 
 To get a bit more specific, the NEF defines mental representations in terms of both 
the nonlinear encoding of stimuli into patterns of neural spikes, and the weighted linear 
decoding of such spikes into the physical variables they represent (Eliasmith, 2003). The 
encoding procedure is characterized by the ‘tuning curve’ or response function of a given 
neuron in relation to a particular stimulus, and by the timing of the intervals between the 
neuron’s spikes in response to changes in the stimulus. To give a simple example, two 
regions in the brainstem called the nuclei prepositus hypoglossi (NPH) and the vostral medial 
vestibular nucleus (VN) contain neurons with tuning curves that plot a relation between 
horizontal eye position and spiking activity (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003). Accordingly, 
neurons in NPH and VN collectively ‘encode’ a measurement of eye position into a pattern 
of neural responses.  
 The decoding procedure, also necessary for a full characterization of neural 
representation, is specified by weighting the responses of each neuron in accordance with 
how useful it is for describing the stimulus, and by summing these responses over the 
relevant population and over time (Eliasmith, 2003). The result of this sum is an estimation 
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of the variable that has been encoded (i.e. the position of the eye).26 One can accordingly 
think of the decoding procedure as a method for extracting the content of a representation, 
since what is being decoded is the set of properties the representation ascribes to its referent. 
Lastly, it is also helpful to point out that this characterization of encoding and decoding does 
not limit one to the representation of scalar variables alone. Arbitrarily complex 
representations involving mathematical objects ranging from scalars, vectors, and functions 
to vector fields can also be constructed using the NEF (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003). 
 Just as important as defining representations, however, is accounting for how 
representations can be transformed. It must be possible, in other words, to take the content of 
a representation and change it into to something else in a way that is useful to the cognitive 
system as a whole. Put this way, transformations can be characterized using the notion of 
decoding introduced above (Eliasmith, 2003). Rather than using decoders that yield an 
estimate of the variable or mathematical object a given neural population is taken to 
represent, one can use alternate (or biased) decoders that yield some function of this original 
variable or mathematical object (Eliasmith, 2003; Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003). In the case 
of NPH and VN, what are called representational decoders would produce an estimate of eye 
position (e.g., 15 degrees from midline), while what are called transformational decoders 
                                                     
26 Mathematically, the encoding and decoding relations necessary for defining a scalar 
representation can be characterized in basic form as follows (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003): 
(1)    ai(x) = Gi[αix + Jbias]   (encoding) 
(2)   xestimate =∑ ai(x)φi    (decoding) 
where x is the variable represented, i is an index of the neurons in the population, a is the 
firing rate of a given neuron, Gi is the response function of a given neuron to an input 
current, αi reflects input current as function of the variable x, Jbias is the background input 
current, and φi is the decoder applied to a given neuron.  
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would produce some function of this estimate (e.g., the square root of the eye position). 
Again, it is important to note that this account of transformation can be generalized to 
accommodate arbitrarily complex representations – a high dimensional vector, for instance, 
could be transformationally decoded so as to yield an estimate of its inverse (Eliasmith & 
Anderson, 2003). Moreover, this description of transformation provides a natural way to 
understand how the alignment between cause and conceptual role is established within the 
NEF: cause specifies encoding, while transformational decoding specifies conceptual role. 
So, assuming that a complex linguistic representation can be instantiated by a population of 
neurons, it follows that the linguistic inferences licensed by this representation can be also 
described in terms of transformational decoding. The NEF, in short, remains responsible to a 
two-factor theory of content at any level of representational complexity. 
 A final point worth mentioning about the NEF is that it also incorporates dynamics 
into its characterization of the representational and transformational capacities of neural 
systems (Eliasmith, 2003). This is achieved by adapting modern control theory to describe 
the representations instantiated by neural populations as state variables in a dynamical 
system. The reason this is important is that it allows for a theory that is responsive to 
temporal considerations and thereby avoids certain challenges faced by classicist accounts of 
cognition that generally ignore time. For details about dynamics in the NEF, see Eliasmith & 
Anderson (2003). 
 To conclude, a brief consideration of the main available accounts of mental content 
suggests that, in the absence of the alignment problem, a two-factor theory can outcompete 
both causal theories and conceptual role theories. The specific two-factor theory I adopt is 
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strongly motivated by the details of how neural systems function, and it can describe how 
content is ascribed to such systems in a mathematically precise and theoretically sound 
manner.  
 
3.3 Scaling Up to the Level of Concepts in a Representational Hierarchy 
 One notable feature of the account of content described thus far is that it is has only 
been explicated in terms of very low-level representations (i.e. those describing 
proprioceptive states). But since the content of a concept is prima facie more complex than 
the content of a basic perceptual representation, we need some way to bridge the gap between 
the two. Helpfully, Eliasmith (forthcoming) has developed a description of this scaling 
process in the context of work on a general account of biological cognition known as the 
Semantic Pointer Architecture (SPA). I initially consider the technical details of this account 
in order to describe how it can be used to generate complex representations, and I next 
consider a couple of different approaches to the challenge of elaborating upon these details to 
fully account for the criteria from chapter one.  
The first idea to highlight from the SPA is that complex perceptual representations 
can be compressed into simpler summary representations that capture statistical properties of 
the inputs they derive from. A retinal image of a table in one’s visual field, for instance, will 
initially be encoded as a pattern of activity in a large population of neurons. Through 
transformations, however, further layers of neural populations can produce increasingly 
abstract statistical summaries of the original visual input. Eventually, a highly compressed 
version of the input can be produced. This representation will be instantiated as a high 
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dimensional vector represented by the activity of a population of neurons at the top of a 
hierarchical network, and is referred to as a semantic pointer. A compressed representation of 
a table in one’s visual field would accordingly be referred to as a semantic pointer of a table 
image. Similar semantic pointers can also be generated using other modalities such as 
audition and sensation.    
The reason these compressed perceptual representations are called semantic pointers 
is because they retain semantic information about the states they represent by virtue of being 
non-arbitrarily related to these states through the compression process. The reason why the 
representations are called pointers is because they can be used to “point to” or regenerate the 
representations at lower levels in the compression network. Moreover, any given semantic 
pointer can be manipulated independently of the network that was used to generate it. A 
pointer for a table image, for example, could be used in cognitive tasks related to tables 
without necessarily prompting a reactivation of the richer perceptual representations at the 
bottom of the relevant compression network. Eliasmith (forthcoming) puts the overall idea 
this way: 
Semantic pointers, generated by grounded perceptual processing, can be “stripped-
off” of that processing and used to both carry shallow semantics and be treated like a 
symbol. If deep semantics are needed, the semantic pointer can be used to clamp the 
top layer of the perceptual network that gave rise to it, and the network can re-
generate the deep semantics. (p. 108-109) 
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The point to take away from this discussion as a whole is that compressing perceptual 
representations into symbol-like entities provides an important first step in scaling up to the 
level of concepts in a representational hierarchy. 
The final step in bridging the gap between basic perceptual representations and 
concepts involves combining multiple semantic pointers into a single representation. 
Eliasmith (forthcoming) describes this process in terms of the binding operation known as 
circular convolution. Leaving the mathematical details aside, circular convolution can 
essentially be thought of as a function that blends two input vectors into a single output 
vector. And because a semantic pointer just is a high dimensional vector represented by a 
population of neurons, convolution can easily be carried out using the principle of 
transformation discussed above. If two neural populations each instantiating a semantic 
pointer both project into a third population, and the synaptic weights between the populations 
reflect the transformational decoders necessary to compute a convolution function, then the 
resulting vector implemented in the third population will accordingly represent the 
combination of the two input vectors (Eliasmith, forthcoming; see also Thagard & Stewart, 
2011). This process can be repeated indefinitely to build up arbitrary complex 
representations. Finally, such representations are also semantic pointers, because they can be 
unbound to regenerate the subordinate representations from which they are constructed.  
To show how this binding process can produce something resembling a concept, 
consider a simple example like BOOK. Semantics pointers for visual and tactile images of 
books could be combined, along with pointers for an auditory image of the sound ‘book’ and 
a visual image of the letters ‘b-o-o-k’. Additionally, linguistic inferences could be 
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incorporated by binding in representations like CREATED BY AN AUTHOR or MADE OF PAPER. 
Each of these further representations could also be decomposed into a constituent set of 
semantic pointers, perhaps of visual images of a known author, or of an auditory image of 
paper being folded. In all, by selectively binding together semantic pointers from multiple 
perceptual and lexical sources, highly complex representations can be created that contain 
many of the features that we ordinarily take concepts possess.27 For example, a perceptual 
semantic pointer that has been bound into a concept can be thought of as an exemplar 
representation, while a lexical representation like CREATED BY AN AUTHOR can be thought of 
as partially specifying the theory in which the concept is embedded (see Eliasmith, 
forthcoming). 
One might object here that it is a bit unfounded to claim that lexical representations 
like MADE OF PAPER can be presupposed to be available to bind into a concept. However, it 
should be clear that PAPER could be generated on a prior occasion in manner analogous to 
that described in the paragraph above (i.e. by binding together various paper-related semantic 
pointers). MADE OF, in turn, could be thought of as a role used for creating role-filler pairs in 
numerous different representations. Convolving this MADE OF role with the concept PAPER, in 
this case, would give the role-filler pair MADE OF PAPER. A table concept, in comparison, 
might utilize the same role representation to form a different role-filler pair, such as MADE OF 
                                                     
27 This description of the process through which complex representations are generated is bit 
superficial, primarily due to a concern for brevity. Both circular convolution and vector 
addition are components of the construction process, as in the following example from 
Eliasmith (forthcoming): “robinPercept = visual⊗RobinVis + auditory⊗RobinAud…” (p. 
166). The ‘⊗’ symbol here indicates the circular convolution operation, while the ‘+’ symbol 
indicates vector addition. ‘robinPercept’ is accordingly  a semantic pointer incorporating 
various perceptual representations of robins.  
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WOOD. Importantly, this notion of binding concepts to roles can be generalized to account for 
the creation of sentences (Eliasmith, forthcoming). Binding various representations of 
grammatical roles to concepts can, for instance, create a sentence like “the boy chased the 
dog” (Eliasmith, forthcoming, p. 137). The concept CHASE would be bound to a ‘verb’ role 
representation, the concept BOY would be bound to an ‘agent’ role representation, and so 
on.28  
Altogether, the point of spending all of this time giving an overview of the semantic 
pointer architecture is to illustrate its ability to provide a possible bridge between the theory 
of representational content underlying the NEF and an account of concepts. As mentioned, 
though, this description is primarily technical and does not offer a complete solution to the 
explanatory challenges posed in chapter one. I accordingly adopt the SPA largely as means 
by which to approach the dual challenges of explaining content and neural plausibility. So, 
while the SPA is highly suggestive of a theory of concepts, it nonetheless leaves a number of 
questions regarding things like publicity, reference, and compositionality somewhat open 
ended from a psychological and philosophical perspective.  
 To approach matters more from this perspective, one can think of the semantic 
pointer architecture as providing a neural implementation of something fairly similar to the 
accounts of concepts given by Lawrence Barsalou (1999) and Jesse Prinz (2002).29 A core 
                                                     
28 Important questions regarding the origin of such role representations could be raised here, 
but examining these in detail is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that I think it 
is likely that these role representations will turn out to be largely innate in some cases (e.g., 
grammatical roles), while largely learned in other cases (e.g., roles specifying the nature of 
some entity, as in the case MADE OF). 
29 Eliasmith (forthcoming) states as much, while highlighting some differences between these 
accounts and the characterization of concepts the SPA suggests (p. 361-363). One primary 
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tenet of these so-called neo-empiricist accounts is that conceptual processing always involves 
‘simulation’ or the re-activation of multimodal representations that have become stored in 
long-term memory.30 On Barsalou’s view, concepts just are the ‘simulators’ that produce 
such simulations. A simulator, in turn, is constituted by an organized system or “frame” of 
perceptual symbols that correspond to a category, and by the simulations that this frame 
produces through the selective transfer of different symbols into working memory (Barsalou, 
1999, p. 590). So, just as a semantic pointer unbinds to reproduce various low-level 
perceptual states it, so too does a simulator. The deep semantic information ‘pointed to’ by a 
pointer is likewise akin to information contained within a simulator’s frame. One can 
accordingly think of a semantic pointer, at least in part, as a neurocomputational description 
of a simulator (Eliasmith, forthcoming). 
 Prinz (2002) develops Barsalou’s account from a more philosophical perspective by 
adopting the notion of a “proxytype” (p. 148). Concepts, according to Prinz, are proxytypes, 
and proxytypes are “perceptually derived representations that can be recruited by working 
memory to represent a category” (p. 149). Put this way, a proxytype can be best understood 
as a specific simulation of a category, and the capacity to token proxytype can be explained 
                                                                                                                                                                    
difference is that the SPA avoids any strict opposition to the postulation of amodal symbols 
in conceptual systems, contra Barsalou and Prinz.  
30 To provide a bit more detail about the nature of simulation, consider the following 
description offered by Barsalou et al. (2008): “On perceiving dogs, for example, the brain 
captures modal states in the visual, auditory, and somatosensory systems about how dogs 
look, sound, and feel, respectively…On later occasions, when representing knowledge about 
dogs, the brain attempts to reactivate these multimodal states, typically succeeding only 
partially. The resultant simulation of the brain states associated with experiencing dogs can 
then be used for a wide variety of purposes, including inference, recollection, language, and 
thought” (p. 247).  
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by appeal to a simulator.31 One difference, then, between the proxytype view and the 
simulator view is that the proxytype view is consistent with the idea that one can have 
multiple concepts for single category. For example, when thinking about bicycles on 
different occasions, one can undoubtedly generate different bicycle simulations. But if this 
true, then each time one produces a novel bicycle simulation, and hence a novel bicycle 
proxytype, one also tokens a novel BICYCLE concept (since concepts are proxytypes). I think 
this result actually counts against Prinz’s view to some extent – multiplying concepts to such 
a degree is not parsimonious – but one could adjust the theory slightly and still get something 
roughly equivalent to the account of perceptual symbol systems offered by Barsalou. So, it is 
perhaps best to think of the difference between simulators and proxytypes in terms of their 
respective explanatory targets – Prinz focuses primarily on giving an account of concepts that 
meets a number philosophical criteria akin to those set out it chapter one, while Barsalou’s 
goal is in large part to provide a scientific explanation of various observed conceptual 
phenomena involving things like categorization, inference, and related fMRI data.  
 Given the commonalities between semantic pointers, proxytypes, and simulators, one 
might also be inclined to borrow from the theoretical aspects of the work Barsalou and Prinz 
to fill in any philosophical gaps left by the notion that concepts can be constructed by binding 
together various compressed perceptual representations. Marrying the three views, in other 
words, could give one an account of concepts that has the advantage of simultaneously 
possessing neural, psychological, and philosophical plausibility. I am sympathetic towards 
this approach, but propose instead to start at the neural level, build upwards, and consider and 
                                                     
31 Prinz (2002) would likely agree with this assessment given his acknowledgement of the 
commonalities between his work and Barsalou’s (p. 152).  
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borrow from theories described at the level of psychology as they become applicable. The 
result of employing this methodology is essentially a philosophical elaboration of the 
semantic pointer architecture, and as mentioned, one that presents concepts as dynamically 
structured entities that have their content determined holistically by the system of 
representations in which they are situated.  
 
3.4 Dynamic Holism Defined and Defended 
 Dynamic holism is a thesis about the structure and content of concepts, and it is the 
result of employing the two-factor theory underlying the NEF to analyze the representations 
built using the semantic pointer architecture. Put broadly, the thesis is this: a concept is a 
representation that specifies a set of possible transformations,32 and because these possible 
transformations are determined relative to other representations in a system, the content of a 
concept is determined holistically. The main upshot of this thesis is that it makes sense to 
characterize the structure of a concept dynamically, since gaining access to the content that 
results from the transformations a concept describes is an inherently temporal process. In 
what follows, I develop a detailed argument for dynamic holism that draws on further 
considerations of the nature of content and structure.  
A few initial observations can help set the stage for the argument. First of all, if one 
takes seriously the idea that what a given neural population represents can be extracted using 
a representational (rather than transformational) decoder, then it likely follows that no single 
population can represent all of the content typically associated with the average lexical 
                                                     
32 To give an example, the concept DOG might be instantiated as a vector that has the 
potential to be transformed into a vector that represents WAGS TAIL, amongst other things.  
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concept. Consider an example. If BOOK is hypothesized to be instantiated by a population of 
neurons that has encoded the result of some binding operation (or some transformation of a 
prior binding operation), then decoding this population will simply give a vector that is the 
convolution of two input vectors (or some transformation of a vector that is the convolution 
of two input vectors). Thus, decoding the population is unlikely to yield content like “made 
of paper” or “created by an author” unless various further transformations of what the 
population represents are decoded too.33 Overall, it is simply unrealistic to think that a single 
population of neurons can be decoded to extract all of the content of even a simple concept.    
 Next, one might therefore be inclined to think that the content of a concept is 
distributed amongst several different neural populations that are activated simultaneously. In 
the case of BOOK, decoding each population would give a different portion of the content of 
the concept – one population might yield the content “made of paper” while another might 
yield “created by an author,” and so on.34 The problem with this view is that is that it implies 
an unrealistic containment model of concept structure. Consider that one can token the 
concept BOOK with or without being aware of the content “created by an author.”35 And if this 
is true, then it cannot be the case that tokening BOOK is equivalent to the activation of a set of 
                                                     
33 For clarity, recall that I take the content of a representation to be the set of properties it 
ascribes to its intentional objects.  
34 It is, of course, unrealistic to suppose that a single population of neurons could be decoded 
to yield a content like “made of paper” given the preceding discussion of the SPA, but the 
present discussion is not impacted significantly by this oversimplification.  
35 To provide some empirical evidence for this claim, consider that in experiments involving 
word association and property generation tasks for various concepts, subjects consistently 
perform more quickly on the association tasks than the property generation tasks (see e.g. 
Barsalou et al., 2008). This indicates that people access different contents associated with a 
concept at different times. This evidence arguably undermines the plausibility of containment 
models in general.  
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neural populations that can be collectively decoded to yield all of the contents associated 
with BOOK. Some of these contents will simply not be apparent on most of the occasions that 
one thinks about books. So, while identifying a concept with a single neural population yields 
too little in the way of content, indentifying a concept with a whole set of populations likely 
yields too much.  
 A natural solution to this problem is to adapt a containment model so that only a 
variable subset of the populations instantiating a concept are activated at any one time. But 
given that the NEF describes representations in terms of encoding and decoding procedures, I 
think it makes more sense to describe such variable tokenings in terms of transformations 
that are licensed by a concept. To explain, suppose that one neural population instantiates a 
representation with the content “book” (i.e. the sound of the word), while another population 
instantiates a representation with the content “made of paper.” In order to account for the fact 
that a tokening of BOOK can yield one, both, or neither of these contents, it makes the most 
sense to suppose that both populations instantiate possible transformations (or biased 
decodings) of a single representation that is the source of all book-related content. Depending 
on how this source representation is transformed (and on how these transformations are 
subsequently transformed), one can derive any number of what one might call different 
‘unpackings’ of BOOK. Putting things this way, one is reminded of the semantic pointer 
architecture, since a high-level semantic pointer would be a natural candidate for the single 
representation that enables such unpacking. 
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 Lastly, it is worth observing a distinction suggested by Mendelovici (2010) between 
the source content and the derived content of a concept.36 Source content in this case would 
be the content of the representation that licenses the various transformations that ‘unpack’ 
BOOK. Derived content, in contrast, would be the content of the various representations that 
result from these transformations. Strictly speaking, I use the term ‘content’ hereafter to refer 
to source content, since I have already established that the representations we are interested 
in characterizing are the representations that are the source of the various ‘unpacked’ 
contents implicated in conceptual processing.  
These initial observations about neural representation and content are suggestive of 
the following formulation: a concept, to a first approximation, is a representation that 
possesses as its content a set of possible transformations which can collectively yield all of 
the further content necessary for things like inference, categorization, and communication. 
This conclusion is, of course, entirely consistent with the SPA, but it illuminates something 
important about the content of those representations deemed concepts. Put simply, decoding 
the population of neurons that instantiates a given concept will not immediately yield any 
content that could be used to describe what the concept refers to. Rather, such decoding 
would simply give an estimate of a vector that has what we might call the transformation 
potential to yield further contents that do actually describe what the concept refers to. BOOK, 
for instance, would be represented only as a vector that has the potential to be transformed to 
                                                     
36 I adapt Mendelovici’s (2010) usage, since she defines source and derived content in the 
context of a comprehensive theory of mental representation that differs in important ways 
from the account being developed here.  
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yield other vectors that correspond to representations like CREATED BY AN AUTHOR.  The 
content of concept, in short, is rather uninformative without further modification.   
 With the basics of content firmly established, it is now possible to explain why the 
account of concepts being developed here is inherently holistic. For one thing, in order for a 
cognitive system to realize the potential transformations specified by a concept, the system 
must also contain a variety of other representations that enable these transformations to take 
place. Recall from the description of the semantic pointer architecture that complex 
representations are created by binding together various other representations. If one assumes 
that a concept is constructed through such binding procedures, then the only way to realize 
the transformation potential of a concept is to carry out various unbinding operations that 
yield those representations that were initially conjoined. And in order for these operations to 
take place, the system must counterintuitively already possess each representation that can be 
derived as a result of unbinding.  
 The reason why these derived representations have to be present in the system in 
order for the necessary unbinding to take place has to do with the technical details of 
reversing a convolution operation. Convolution, recall, involves combining two input vectors 
into a third, output vector. The purpose of reversing this operation is, accordingly, to 
reproduce one of the input vectors, and doing this is best achieved by convolving the output 
vector with the inverse of the other, unwanted input vector (see Eliasmith, forthcoming). 
More formally, one can characterize this process using three vectors A, B, and C as follows 
(Eliasmith, forthcoming):  
(3) C = A ⊗  B (Binding of vectors A and B) 
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(4) A ≈ C ⊗  B-1 (Unbinding of vector C to recover vector A) 
 The important point to draw from this description of binding and unbinding is that realizing 
the potential transformations from C back to A or B requires both A and B to already be 
represented and then transformed (to get either A-1 or B-1) somewhere else in the neural 
system. Put more generally, the transformation potential of a concept (e.g., C) only exists 
relative to the presence of other representations (e.g., A and B). And finally, since this 
transformation potential just is the content of a concept, one can likewise say that the content 
of a concept only exists relative to the content of other representations in the neural system in 
which it is instantiated  
 Having established this much, one could now opt either for molecularism (i.e., that 
the content of a concept depends on some of the other representations in the system in which 
is instantiated) or holism (i.e., that the content of a concept depends on all of the other 
representations in the system in which it is instantiated). Some further consideration of the 
way in which the transformation potential of a concept has been specified, however, indicates 
that holism is the preferable choice. Consider an example. Suppose SPIDER is represented as a 
vector that can be transformed through various unbinding procedures of sort just described to 
yield further representations such as HAS EIGHT LEGS, OCCASIONALLY POISONOUS, EATS 
INSECTS, PRODUCES SILK, and so forth. In order for these representations to emerge out of 
transformations of a SPIDER vector, they all have to be present elsewhere in the system so that 
SPIDER can be convolved with their inverses in the necessary manner. More importantly, the 
transformation potential of, say, LEG could also be contained in the transformation potential 
of SPIDER, since SPIDER could be unpacked in a multitude of ways that incorporate 
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representations derived from LEG (e.g. LEG could be unbound to yield further representations 
like BODILY APPENDAGE USED FOR MOBILITY, so SPIDER could be unbound to form HAS EIGHT 
BODILY APPENDAGES USED FOR MOBILITY). This indicates that the representations necessary 
for unpacking LEG are also relevant to the determination of the content of SPIDER, since the 
full transformation potential of SPIDER can only exist relative to these further representations. 
If one generalizes from this example, it follows that essentially every representation 
in the neural system in which a concept is instantiated is relevant to the determination of the 
content of that concept. SPIDER could be unpacked to yield EATS INSECTS, while INSECT could 
be unpacked to yield HOUSEHOLD PEST, while HOUSEHOLD could be unpacked to yield 
FAMILY RESIDENCE, and so on. Presumably, if one were to continue unpacking in this manner 
indefinitely, one could access essentially any representation that is present in the system. And 
if so, then holism follows trivially, since all representations that can be accessed via the 
unpacking of a concept will be relevant to the determination of the content of that concept. 
To a second approximation, then, a concept is a representation that possesses as its content a 
set of possible transformations that are specified relative to all other representations in the 
neural system in which the concept is instantiated.  
 Given this argument for holism, an argument for the dynamical aspects of concept 
structure follows in a fairly straightforward manner. One can think of concepts as being 
dynamic in two distinct senses. First, since the content of a concept is best understood as a 
set of potential transformations, one can think of a concept as being structured as a set of 
sequential processing states that realize some subset of these transformations. Second, since 
the set of possible transformations that a concept represents is bound to change over time 
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(e.g., either through binding the concept with some further representation as a result of 
learning, or through changes to the other representations in the system), the content of any 
given concept will never be, strictly speaking, static. Elaborating on these two claims is the 
purpose of the remainder of this section.   
  First, consider the idea that a concept is structured as a set of sequential processing 
states that realize a set of transformations. This is a fairly significant departure from the 
dominant accounts of structure in the concept literature.37 Typically, concepts are thought to 
be structured as sets of representations rather that as sets of processes. The crucial advantage 
to characterizing structure dynamically, however, is that it is most consistent with the 
description of content outlined above. If one were to adopt the set-of-representations view of 
structure, one would be committed to the containment model wherein a concept is 
instantiated by a set of neural populations that can be collectively decoded to yield a wide 
range of content. This model, recall, was dismissed on the grounds that it is insufficiently 
flexible to account for the fact that a concept can be tokened with or without tokening any 
range of other related contents. So, if our account of content emphasizes sets of possible 
transformations, then identifying structure with process is favorable to identifying structure 
with a collection of representations.  
 In some ways, however, the separation between the set-of-representations view and 
the process view is a distinction without a difference. According to Eliasmith (forthcoming), 
                                                     
37 Note, however, that this characterization of structure in terms of transformations is closely 
related to the account of structure offered by theory theories. The theory theorist, recall, 
identifies the structure of a concept with its inferential role, which is not very different at all 




the account of representation underlying the NEF and SPA naturally suggests that 
representations “are best thought of as often temporary processing states of activity, rather 
than as objects that reside in a specific location in the system” (p. 360). If so, then a 
representation just is a process of sorts, and one could accordingly translate between process-
based and representation-based descriptions of structure. However, given that representations 
are commonly thought of as static symbols rather processing states, adopting a process-based 
description helps to highlight where this view departs from conventional accounts.  
 Next, consider the idea that the set of possible transformations a concept represents is 
continually being modified over time (i.e. that the content of any given concept is always 
changing). In one sense, this is a relatively uncontroversial claim given that the study of 
conceptual change is an active area of research in both developmental psychology and the 
philosophy of science (see e.g. Carey, 1985; Thagard, 1992). In another sense, though, it is a 
highly controversial claim given that so many theorists think that a high degree of concept 
stability is necessary to enable communication and to explain the predictive adequacy of 
propositional attitude ascriptions (e.g. Fodor, 1987; Fodor, 1998; Laurence & Margolis, 
1999; Prinz, 2002; see Chapter 1). I argue below that a dynamic account of content can 
support a sufficient degree of concept stability, but for the time being, an example can be 
used to illustrate why conceptual content varies temporally. 
Suppose one learns the concept CANCER from public health advertisements or as a 
result of the diagnosis of an ill family member. Initially, CANCER might have as its content a 
set of possible transformations that would yield representations like ILLNESS THAT GIVES ONE 
A TUMOR or ILLNESS THAT IS TREATED WITH CHEMOTHERAPY. Later, however, one might learn 
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that cancer is caused by the uncontrolled division of cells, in which case the vector 
representing CANCER would be convolved with other vectors such that the transformation 
potential of CANCER would come to include CAUSED BY THE UNCONTROLLED DIVISION OF 
CELLS. Learning, in short, involves conceptual change. And as mentioned, if holism is true, 
then any change that takes place in a cognitive system will subtly affect the content of 
representations throughout the system. So overall, one cannot have either holism or concept-
related learning unless one is willing to accept that the content of a concept varies over time.  
At this point, I conclude by offering a brief summary of dynamic holism. Concepts, 
as a final approximation, are representations (i.e., vectors) that specify a transformation 
potential relative to the other representations in a neural system. Accordingly, the content of 
a concept is a set of potential transformations, and the structure of a concept is the sequence 
of processing states that realizes these potential transformations. Because the potential 
transformations a concept represents only exist relative to other representations in the system, 
the content of a concept is specified holistically. And, because holism entails that a concepts’ 
content changes whenever the system changes, the content of a concept is inherently 
dynamic. A dynamic and holistic account of content combined with a dynamic account of 
structure yields dynamic holism.  
 
3.5 The Criteria Revisted 
 Having described dynamic holism and offered a few key arguments in its favor, it is 
now necessary to evaluate how well it fares on the criteria from chapter one. Doing so serves 
two functions: first, the evaluation can hopefully demonstrate that dynamic holism is a viable 
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option alongside classical views, prototypes views, exemplar views, theory theories, and 
informational atomism; second, the evaluation will help to elaborate on a number of aspects 
of the account that have not yet been given due attention. The six relevant criteria, recall, are 
scope, publicity, categorization, content, compositionality, and neural plausibility.  
 
3.5.1 Scope 
 Scope is handled relatively easily. Since the content of a concept could be any 
number of sets of potential transformations, it is conceivable that a single high dimensional 
vector could represent even the most abstract concepts. Take DEMOCRACY as an example. 
Presumably, the vector representing DEMOCRACY would specify a set of potential 
transformations that could result from various unbinding operations to yield numerous other 
representations like SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, VOTING, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, 
ORIGINATED IN ANCIENT GREECE, EXAMPLES: CANADA, BRITAIN, NORWAY, and so forth. 
Moreover, because any number of adjustments can be made to the vector representing 
DEMOCRACY, the potential transformations specified by the vector can be made as complex or 
as simple as one’s understanding of democracy warrants. Similar examples could be 




 Publicity presumably presents one of the most significant challenges to an account of 
concepts that is holistic and treats structure and content dynamically. As Fodor (1998) and 
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others argue, if everyone has slightly different concepts, and everyone’s concepts change 
from one point in time to the next, then communication and generalized intentional 
explanations of behavior become impossible. Dynamic holism is surely open to this criticism, 
but I have already sketched a response in the discussion of theory theories from the previous 
chapter.  
 First of all, establishing strict concept identity across individuals and across time is 
simply an unrealistic benchmark. Non-identical concepts can nonetheless be very similar (by 
specifying a very similar set of potential transformations), and as mentioned earlier, the 
conditions for concept possession can be set through reference to communicative efficacy. 
To elaborate, consider BACTERIA once again. A child’s version of this concept would likely 
specify a relatively small number of possible transformations relative to an adult’s version or 
a bacteriologist’s version. Accordingly, the child will likely misidentify bacteria if probed 
with various descriptions of microscopic life forms, while the bacteriologist will likely not. 
Nonetheless, the bacteriologist will surely understand what the child means when he says 
“Wash your hands to get rid of bacteria” and the child will surely understand the 
bacteriologist when she says “There are bacteria in this Petri dish.”  
 The question, then, is how many (or which) of the potential transformations 
characterizing BACTERIA must be shared in order for these two people to mutually possess the 
concept.38 At minimum, I think it would be possible for someone possess BACTERIA even if 
the representation instantiating the concept only specified a few potential transformations. 
Primary amongst these would likely be a simulation of the sound of the word ‘bacteria.’ But 
                                                     




even if the only other transformation yielded something like KILL WITH LYSOL IN THE 
KITCHEN, one could still be communicatively efficacious because most people would 
immediately infer from a conversation that the things being killed with Lysol in the kitchen 
are bacteria. Moreover, even granting that various misunderstandings might nonetheless 
arise, it is also likely that failures in communication function to prompt learning. For 
instance, one might ask, “What do you mean?” or “Are you talking about bacteria?” and 
thereby align his or her concept more closely with that of the rest of the linguistic 
community. So, in cases where communicative efficacy fails, it is most likely quickly re-
established through concept revision on the part of the less competent individual.39  
 And finally, even if none of the preceding argument is persuasive, consider that non-
identity amongst shared concepts is likely necessary for development in domains such as 
science. If everyone had strictly identical concepts, then it would be impossible for, say, a 
theoretical physicist to develop a revised understanding of BOSON and subsequently inform 
his colleagues. To give another example, it is not even clear that a concept like WATER could 
change throughout history (as it undoubtedly did) unless various people developed slightly 
different water concepts that subsequently became widespread. Overall, so long as 
communicative efficacy is achieved, concept possession follows, and the publicity criterion 
can accordingly be satisfied.  
 
3.5.3 Categorization 
                                                     
39 This glosses over the fact that people might still disagree after questioning, or be unable to 
achieve mutual understanding, but I think such cases would either be rare or restricted to 
abstract or theoretical concepts that are the focus of intense debate. 
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 At first glance, it is not all clear what sort of account of categorization the dynamic 
holist can offer. If concepts are simply vectors with transformation potential, then it remains 
an open question how perceptual inputs could be matched to these vectors, or how one could 
explain things like typicality and exemplar effects. Here, however, one can happily defer to 
the SPA. Perceptual inputs, recall, can be compressed into abstract representations that carry 
shallow semantics. These representations, in turn, can then be bound together to form a high-
level semantic pointer. So, in the case of an encounter with a novel entity in need of 
categorization, one could form a semantic pointer on the fly that combines all of the available 
perceptual information describing the entity (along with descriptive lexical representations 
too) and then match this representation to the concept is it most (or sufficiently) similar to.  
To explain, since the newly constructed semantic pointer would be represented as a 
multidimensional vector, and concepts are also represented as multidimensional vectors, one 
can think of categorization as an operation that finds the preexisting vector that is smallest 
distance from the input vector in a vector space (see Eliasmith, forthcoming). In many ways, 
this is reminiscent of the categorization method employed by dimensional prototype models, 
but the key difference is that incorporating various linguistic representations into the relevant 
vectors can result in similarity calculations that measure something akin to theoretical 
similarity (as opposed to superficial perceptual similarity). 
Moreover, typicality effects can be accounted for by the possibility of a vector being 
generated and bound into a concept that is the mean of a range of vectors representing 
perceptual instances of the concept’s category (Eliasmith, forthcoming). Put another way, 
one of the possible transformations a concept specifies could be the generation of a 
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prototype. Exemplar effects are also easily handled given the previous discussion of 
compressed perceptual representations. Since a semantic pointer generated from the 
perception of a category instance can be bound into a concept, it would also be natural for 
some of possible transformations encoded by a concept to specify the simulation of an 
exemplar. Knowledge effects, as mentioned, can be accounted for by the wide range of 
linguistic representations that can result from the set of potential transformations a concept 
represents. Such representations might describe the ‘essences’ of natural kinds, to give a 
simple example.   
Overall, since dynamic holism is an elaboration of the SPA, and the SPA has all of 
the requisite tools needed to explain categorization, the categorization criterion can be met 
satisfactorily. It might be objected here that I have simply adopted a pluralistic view that 
tacks prototypes and exemplars onto semantic pointers, but the important point to notice is 
that there is a big difference between an account that identifies the structure of a concept 
with a prototype or an exemplar, and an account that identifies a concept with a 
representation that can be transformed to generate a prototype or an exemplar. The account 
described here is more consistent with latter of these two options, and is therefore not best 
described as a pluralistic amalgamation of existing theories.  
 
3.5.4 Content 
 Almost all of the initial motivation for developing dynamical holism stemmed from 
an elaboration of the account of content underlying the NEF and the SPA. But it should be 
clear that there are a number of unresolved issues regarding the ability of a concept to refer to 
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a set class of entities, and the ability of a concept to ascribe certain properties to these 
entities. For example, it seems odd to think of a concept as ascribing a set of potential 
transformations to its referents. Moreover, it is not clear how these potential transformations 
could even pick out the right referents.  
 The first point to notice here is that the potential transformations represented by a 
concept can easily be thought of as specifying a miniature theory or explanatory schema of a 
category.40 And I have already argued that theories do a good job of specifying reference for 
two reasons. First, it makes no sense to say that a concept like BACTERIA refers to things that 
are not captured by even the most up-to-date theories of bacteria because the boundaries of 
the concept’s extension would become epistemically inaccessible. Second, even if concept 
possession exists on a spectrum ranging from minimal to maximal competency, the fact that 
people can revise and adapt their concepts through learning and communication suggests 
that, over time, most people’s concepts will converge on a fairly close approximation of the 
proper extension.  
 Next, to account for cases in which concepts ascribe distinct properties to the same 
referents, one can appeal to the possibility of representations specifying different sets of 
potential transformations that nonetheless pick out the same things. Take BIRD and AVES. 
Both apply to all and only birds, but they could each specify potential transformations that 
yield representations that characterize different features of birds. For instance, transforming 
BIRD would likely yield representations of the dominant characteristics of birds, such as 
wings, feathers, and beaks. Transforming AVES, on the other hand, would likely yield 
                                                     
40 This amounts to saying that the content which ascribes the properties that describe a given 
category is actually derived content, and not the content of the concept proper.  
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representations that relate birds to a set of taxonomical categories (e.g. MEMBER OF THE 
PHYLUM CHORDATA).  
 One might object here that I have not provided an explanation that can cover Twin 
Earth style cases. Specifying reference through appeal to theories shies away from 
externalism to some extent, so this is an important objection, especially considering the 
commitment to a two-factor theory of content expressed earlier. There are, fortunately, two 
available responses. First, it may be the case that one is not aware of the difference between 
H2O and XYZ due to an ignorance of current theories about the clear, colorless liquids that 
fill lakes and streams. If so, then one is merely in possession of a degenerate water concept 
(i.e., one is minimally competent), and any situation in which he or she misapplies WATER to 
XYZ is an understandable case of misrepresentation. Second, if no one is in possession of an 
explanatory schema that can discriminate between H2O and XYZ, then we can simply say 
that there is a metaphysical distinction between WATER and WATERT (since tokens of each 
concept are caused by different things), but no epistemological distinction (since no one can 
tell the difference between these causes under any present conditions). So overall, Twin 
Earth cases pose no particular problem.  
 
3.5.5 Compositionality 
 As a slight caveat for what follows, it should be noted that none of the accounts 
considered in chapter two had a fully adequate explanation of compositionality. The reason, 
it seems, is finding such an explanation is a difficult and complex task. So, while I think that 
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some unresolved issues are bound to remain after the discussion offered here, I also think that 
dynamic holism offers some interesting insights into how concepts combine.  
 In one sense, the SPA has already given an account of compositionality in terms of 
the convolution of vectors. For example, in the case of BOOK, it was argued that binding 
together various compressed perceptual and lexical representations of books could produce a 
representation that functions like a concept. One might have to concede that this is a 
demonstration of representational compositionality rather than conceptual compositionality 
(since BOOK is not a compound concept), but I think that this approach can be extended to 
account for paradigmatic combinations like PET FISH and DOG SHOW.  
 To start, consider that when concepts are combined on the present account, all that is 
being combined are two vectors that represent sets of potential transformations. If so, then 
the sort of emergent features that posed problems for prototypes, exemplars, theories, and 
definitions only manifest themselves when a compound concept is unpacked. So one can say 
that it is the derived content of compound concept that yields the features of that have 
traditionally been difficult to explain.  Moreover, the manner in which any given concept is 
unpacked is largely dependent on the system in which it resides – recall that the potential 
transformations a concept represents are only realizable in conjunction with other 
representations. This suggests a novel approach to characterizing compositionality: concepts 
combine in a straightforward manner through convolution, but the dynamic structure of a 
compound concept emerges in novel ways due to the interaction of the compound 
representation with the system of which it is a part.  
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 The crucial advantage of this approach is that essentially shifts the burden of 
explaining compositionality off of individual pairs of concepts and onto the system as a 
whole. To illustrate, one can think of a compound concept as a vector waiting to have the 
system in which is situated impose various transformations on it. Depending on the nature of 
the system, the potential transformations specified by a single vector can change in numerous 
ways. In one sense, this means that the other representations in the system embody all of the 
background knowledge that determines how concepts compose. If these other representations 
collectively specify contents that fail to cohere with the initial unpacking of a complex 
concept, then they can be used to extract a different unpacking that is coherent. 
 To illustrate this idea with an example, consider the combination of PET and FISH. 
Individually, these two concepts would likely specify a set of fairly predictable potential 
transformations. PET could unpack to yield DOMESTICATED ANIMAL, LIVES IN HOUSE, 
EXAMPLES: GOLDEN LAB, SIAMESE CAT, CANARY, and so on, while FISH could unpack to yield 
LAYS EGGS, LIVES IN WATER, BREATHES THROUGH GILLS, HAS FINS AND SCALES, and so forth. 
Now assume that the two vectors specifying all of these potential transformations are 
convolved to form a third vector. The problem, it seems, is that any unbinding operations 
applied to this third vector will likely only re-access those representations initially yielded by 
the transformations encoded in PET and FISH. Unpacking PET FISH, in other words, might yield 
contents that describe pets and fish, but it will not easily yield contents that describe 
emergent features like the fact that pet fish live in tanks.  
 The way around this problem is to note that unpackings of PET FISH that are conducted 
in this manner will eventually yield incoherent groupings of contents. To give a simple 
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example, if one were to unpack PET to yield LIVES IN HOUSE, and then unpack HOUSE to yield 
STRUCTURE SHELTERED FROM WATER, one would produce a conflict given that FISH can be 
unpacked to yield LIVES IN WATER.  Creatures that live in water cannot live in structures 
empty of water, so if PET FISH is compositional, then some additional potential transformation 
must be available that eliminates this conflict. One candidate for this additional 
transformation would be a movement from WATER to CONTAINED IN TANKS, BOTTLES, 
GLASSES, ETC. Unpacking TANK, in turn, would yield a variety of contents indicating that 
tanks are exactly the right size, shape, and appearance to house a domesticated fish. 
Accordingly, one could go on to derive a representation like LIVES IN A TANK WHICH 
CONTAINS WATER to modify or supplement the original representation of LIVES IN WATER, and 
thereby reestablish coherence amongst the various representations that have been unpacked. 
Lastly, rather than go through a similar derivation every time the concept is tokened, one 
could simply bind this representation of an emergent feature back into the concept through 
convolution and thereby make it more easy to access in the future.  
 The point, then, is that the system of representations in which PET and FISH are 
situated will prompt the derivation of new representations that describe the emergent features 
of PET FISH. A composition function, in other words, is specified by the coherence relations 
that hold between all of the representations that can be accessed through transformations of a 
vector representing a combined concept. And given that this means that all of the 
representations in the system are relevant to understanding the composition function, concept 
combination is better described as a phenomenon involving an entire system of 
representations rather a simple pair. 
 
 82 
Finally, given that people are likely to share many of the same representations and 
possess concepts that specify many of the same potential transformations, they are also likely 
to derive the same emergent features when combining concepts independently. Although the 
question of how a given individual will combine any two of concepts is ultimately an 
empirical one (since the answer depends on the what representations the individual already 
possesses), I think the notion that similar representational systems can lead to similar 
derivations of emergent features provides a natural way to preserve concept publicity in the 
context of compositionality. More could undoubtedly be said here, but suffice it to say that if 
compositionality is phenomenon that can only be specified in relation to an entire system of 
representations, it is possibly even more complex of a phenomenon than is currently 
acknowledged.  
 
3.5.6 Neural Plausibility 
 Neural plausibility needs little in the way of discussion. Since dynamic holism is 
essentially a philosophical elaboration of the semantic pointer architecture, and the semantic 
pointer architecture relates symbol-like representations to the functional properties of 
neurons, dynamic holism is fully consistent with the relevant neuroscientific details in a way 
that few other accounts are. Moreover, Eliasmith (forthcoming) demonstrates that the SPA is 
able to account for the resource considerations and computational considerations highlighted 
in chapter one. For example, binding together two vectors sufficiently complex for encoding 
adult-sized vocabularies only requires about 70,000 neurons, and empirical data indicates 
that interconnectivity in the cortex supports the projection of a given neuron into any of 
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approximately 85,000 others. Considering that there are approximately one hundred billion 
neurons in the brain, these numbers leave ample room to support the full range of human 
conceptual capacities.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 Altogether, I think dynamic holism offers a promising characterization of the 
structure of concepts. It is highly plausible from a neuroscientific perspective due to its roots 
in the NEF and the SPA, and it is equal or superior to existing theories when it comes to 
explaining scope, publicity, categorization, content, and compositionality. Consider each 
theory in turn. Definitional views offer a decent account of publicity, but they lack sufficient 
scope, they fail to specify reference properly, and they do not provide an adequate 
explanation of compositionality. They also fail to explain categorization effects.  
Prototypes have the advantage of explaining typicality, but like definitions, they lack 
scope, they do not specify reference, and they do not compose well. Further categorization 
phenomena like knowledge effects are also a problem for most models of prototypes. 
Exemplar models, in contrast, offer scope and a slightly improved explanation of 
categorization, but content and compositionality remain difficulties. In comparison, Dynamic 
Holism can account for the available categorization data, explain content and 
compositionality, and meet the scope and publicity criteria. It is accordingly preferable to 
views that suggest that concepts are structured as definitions, prototypes, or exemplars.  
 A similar conclusion emerges from a comparison with theory-based views and 
informational atomism. Theory theories can explain scope, publicity, and content, but they 
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cannot easily account for typicality effects or compositionality. Dynamic Holism does an 
equal job of matching these successes (given that it offers many of the same explanations), 
and it can improve on the failures. Lastly, with informational atomism, only scope and 
publicity are easily explained. Categorization is ignored completely and the postulation of 
asymmetric dependency relations creates a problematic account of both content and 
compositionality. Again, Dynamic Holism overcomes these explanatory shortcomings. I 
thereby conclude that it is preferable to both theory-based views and informational atomism.  
 Finally, even if one is not entirely persuaded by the philosophical arguments I have 
offered in support of dynamic holism, I still think that the commitment it displays to the 
available neuroscientific evidence makes it highly worthy of attention. In other words, even 
if one disagrees with the exact route that I have taken from an account of neural content to an 
account of concepts, my arguments should nonetheless make it clear that any account that 
emerges from methodology that starts with neural considerations is likely going to look quite 
different from the dominant alternatives. So, while much work remains to be done, and many 
questions regarding matters like concept acquisition and language use remain unresolved, I 
take it that I have shown that the notion that concepts are structured dynamically is plausible 
entailment of a theory of content that defines mental representations in terms of both cause 
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